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 FOREWORD 
The market milk industry, like many others, has been influenced by the 
pronounced changes in the thinking of courts and legislators with respect to 
the established laissez faire principles of business. The economic maladjust­
ments of this period caused many groups to clamor for state protection from 
economic competition.  The market milk industry was one of the first major 
industries to  feel the repercussions of this economic unbalance.  Milk 
strikes and violence were widespread, especially in the larger cities.  Con­
sumers and producers suffered in common. The consumers were left without 
an adequate milk supply and the producers without adequate prices.  Eco­
nomic control in the form of minimum pricing and market regulations ap­
peared to be the only immediate means of stabilizing the fluid milk industry. 
The vital importance of milk to health and the dependence of the house­
wife on supplies from distant sources have given rise to the doctrine that 
milk is a public utility and should be regulated as such.  The public has 
demanded better sanitation in the handling of milk, but efforts at better sani­
tation have been interwoven with economic considerations. 
New York is credited with being the first state to enact a milk control 
law (1933) with minimum price fixing provisions.  Twenty-five other states 
soon followed with parallel legislation.  Similar control legislation has become 
common to many other industries since 1933. The majority of the state milk 
control laws have withstood almost constant constitutional attacks.  The laws 
have been upheld primarily on the ground that economic controls of the fluid 
milk business are necessary to protect the public health and welfare. 
The Oregon Milk Control law of 1933, as amended, has been a political 
issue since its passage.  Legislators have been elected and defeated on the 
issue of support of the Milk Control Act or opposition to it.  The Act has 
barely survived several court and legislative attacks and one general referen­
dum.  It is still the subject of active controversy, both political and economic. 
This analysis of the existing state milk control laws was undertaken with 
the hope that the experience of the nineteen states that have such legislation 
would be useful to all those persons and groups that are interested in estab­
lishing, perfecting, or administering milk control legislation. 
E. L. POTTER, Head 
Division of Agricultural Economics SUMMARY 
Certain phases of this report are given in outline form in the Appendix. 
The essential facts in the descriptive analysis follow. 
1. Efforts to regulate the fluid milk industry began in Massachusetts in 
1856.  The Massachusetts law like all other state milk laws passed prior to 
1933 related to milk sanitation.  Sanitary regulations were originally intro­
duced to protect public health.  There appears to be some evidence that 
sanitary regulations are used in some markets as economic regulators to 
restrict milk from entering the market, thereby maintaining, for all intents 
and purposes, a closed market for the benefit of a small percentage of all the 
producers. 
2. The economics of the fluid milk industry is so closely related to the 
general economy that the economic position of the industry seems to corres­
pond to the status of business generally.  The turbulent economic conditions 
in the early part of the past decade appear responsible for the accompanying 
chaos in the milk industry.  Some of the economic maladjustments contribut­
ing to the unsettled conditions in the industry are :  (a) depressed farm 
prices, especially for cheese, butter, and evaporated milk, in relation to fluid 
milk prices ;  (b) overproduction resulting from low feed prices and dairy­
men trying to maintain their decreasing incomes by increasing unit volume ; 
(c) lack of alternative economic opportunities for capital and labor resulting 
in an overexpansion of distribution facilities, which are still maintained in 
some markets ;  (d) decreasing per capita consumption of fluid milk ;  (e) a 
gradual change in the structure of our population manifested in the declining 
percentage of young people ; and (f) high cost of production resulting from 
stringent sanitation requirements. 
3. Federal and state legislation designed to exercise economic control 
over the fluid milk industry was sponsored primarily by producer groups 
that desired to obtain a greater share of the consumer's dollar, thereby enab­
ling them to maintain a more favorable standard of living.  These economic 
regulations were introduced as emergency measures during the depression 
period (1933-1935) and most of them continue.  Legislators justified eco­
nomic regulation of the fluid milk industry on the bases that it was necessary 
(a) to maintain a pure and wholesome supply of milk for human consump­
tion, and (b) to maintain economic stability in the industry, thereby avoiding 
some of the social and economic consequences that might have resulted from 
a complete dislocation of the established production and marketing channels 
and from the resulting unemployment during a period of widespread economic 
distress.  Based on a study of the several state milk control laws and the 6  OREGON STATE COLLEGESTUDIES IN ECONOMICS 
administration of such laws, the authors believe that the major benefits of 
such controls have gone to the fluid milk producers.  This has been accom­
plished by reducing dealer margins.  It is doubtful whether the consumer has 
obtained any tangible benefit from such legislation. 
4. Members of milk control agencies in each state are appointed by and 
subject to removal by the governor.  The administrative and enforcement 
staff in most states is selected by the control agency.  Membership of the 
control agency varies in number from 1 to 7 and in fifteen states is selected 
from the members of the milk industry, although the majority of the state 
laws require the selection of at least one board member who is not connected 
with the fluid milk industry.  The Oregon law requires that no member of 
the control board shall be in any way connected with the fluid milk business. 
Compensation is usually limited to per diem and traveling expenses ;  four 
states, however, provide annual salaries for board members. Local milk com­
mittees are provided for by four states to aid the state control agency in the 
administration and enforcement of the law. 
5. The control agency in fifteen of the states is financed principally by 
fees levied on the members of the industry.  Only one state appropriates all 
the needed funds from the state treasury without levying fees.  Several of 
the larger states have had to appropriate funds to supplement the monies 
collected from fees. 
6. Powers of the control agency are delegated to it by the legislators 
and in every state are extremely broad. The power of establishing rules and 
regulations for a specific market is ordinarily given the control agency.  Six 
state laws provide that before the control agency may function in a specific 
market, members of the industry must give a majority approval.  In the 
remaining states the agency may act on its own initiative.  Investigational, 
licensing, and bonding powers are bestowed on the control agency for the 
purpose of protecting certain groups, which in most instances are the pro­
ducers.  Because demoralizing trade practices were one of the evils operating 
in the milk markets during the depression period, every state act provides 
that the control agency shall have discretionary power to control such prac­
tices.  The right to deny, suspend, or revoke a license is granted the control 
agency in almost every state.  While these powers rest with the agencies, 
such severe penalties are seldom used against violators, because they fail to 
meet with the wholehearted approval of the public.  The power to designate 
marketing areas and the licensing power can be and are used to maintain a 
closed market and to prevent a free movement of milk from one market area 
to another. 7  ECONOMIC CONTROL OF THE MARKET MILK INDUSTRY 
7. In all but five states standards for establishing prices are prescribed 
for the control agency.  These follow :  (a) cost of production and distribu­
tion, (b) fair return to producer and distributor, (c) balance between pro­
duction and consumption, and (d) purchasing power of the public.  Only 
recently has much attention been given the problem of fixing equitable prices 
for fluid milk based on the prices obtainable for manufacturing milk.  Cali­
fornia establishes minimum prices on market butterfat by formula.  This 
formula definitely relates the price of market butterfat to factory butterfat. 
It is a workable plan and it deserves the thorough attention of other state 
control agencies. 
8. A system of market-wide pooling appears to be essential in order to 
obtain a uniform payment per unit to all producers in a particular market. 
Individual-dealer type pools provide equalized payments to producers supply­
ing one dealer, but the returns of all producers in a particular market are not 
necessarily the same for a similar quantity and quality of milk.  The basic-
surplus pricing plan or the combination price plan, in which the basic-surplus 
and class-use system are combined, appears necessary in the larger markets. 
These plans tend to promote more uniform yearly production and to avoid 
burdensome surpluses during the high-producing months.  Producer quotas 
used in conjunction with these two price plans are employed deliberately by 
several control agencies to discourage surplus milk from moving into 
markets. 
9. Resale price fixing, employed at one time by all the states whose milk 
laws are in effect, has been completely discarded by two states and in several 
other states minimum resale price fixing is under severe attack.  The effec­
tiveness of minimum resale price fixing is especially dependent on public 
support or public apathy.  The principal attacks against minimum resale 
prices revolve mainly on the point that they are used only to fix the "spread" 
for the distributors and as such the consumer does not benefit from dis­
tributor competition.  Since 1937 the Federal Government has not provided 
for resale prices in any agreements or orders in any of the markets that it is 
administering.  The early Federal marketing agreements established before 
1937 carried resale price provisions, but most of them are not being enforced. 
10. The majority of the laws provide for adequate legal remedies for 
those who feel that they are injured by an action of the control agency or by 
the provisions of the law.  Considering the large number of appeals by 
members of the industry from decisions of control agencies or lower courts, 
the percentage of appellants that have successfully challenged the laws or 
regulations are very few.  Satisfactory means are likewise provided for 
enforcing the several laws.  The control agency in almost every state is also 8  OREGON STATE COLLEGE-STUDIES IN ECONOMICS 
granted the power of injunction, without having to show cause that a legal 
remedy exists.  Most of the laws specify certain acts as being unlawful, 
principally the buying and selling of milk under conditions and prices other 
than that specified.  Penalties for violation are usually limited to fines and/or 
jail sentences, and in some states the fines increase in size with subsequent 
offenses.  The harshest penalty, of course, is to refuse to grant a license, or 
to suspend, or to revoke a license.  Specific penalties are provided for failure 
to answer a subpoena. 
11. It has been established by many court decisions that the milk indus­
try does not fall into the category of a public utility, but as it is greatly 
concerned with the public interest it can be controlled under the police power 
of the state.  Continuous favorable court decisions have definitely established 
the power of the state to regulate the economic activities of the industry, 
including price maintenance and market control.  Several state laws have 
been declared invalid primarily on the legal ground that there was an undue 
delegation of legislative or judicial powers. 
12. Such administrative problems as pseudo-cooperatives, establishment 
of equitable producer and resale prices, the control of milk shipped in inter­
state trade, and satisfactory pooling mechanisms are still to be solved in 
many states.  These problems no doubt will require additional legislation, 
educational campaigns, and closer cooperation among the several public con­
trol agencies, if the administrative and enforcement problems are to be 
lessened.  Constitutional limitations will continue to be a barrier to certain 
types of regulation. 
13. State milk control laws are considered by many people to have stabi­
lized milk markets and to have established favorable returns to producers.  It 
is questionable whether they can be considered lasting remedies. The course 
of future controls in the industry is not known, but the trend of thought of 
the Wisconsin legislators may provide a clue as to the thinking of some law­
making bodies.  (16)  In 1935 a bill was presented to the Wisconsin legis­
lature to permit cities to engage in the distribution of milk with the hope of 
reducing the distributing "spread." The bill passed the assembly and lost in 
the senate by five votes. Two years later a similar but more detailed bill was 
introduced and recommended by the legislative committee for passage.  This 
measure was lost in sine die adjournment. An Analysis of State Laws Designed to
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INTRODUCTION 
In a recently published statement on the milk problems, Mr. H. V. 
Noyes, Director of Agriculture and Markets for the State of New York, 
states :  "I think I can truthfully say that no agricultural problem in the 
northeastern United States is so much discussed and so little understood." 
(18)  This statement well exemplifies a situation that can be applied to any 
area in the United States where an orderly system of milk marketing has been 
attempted or where it is a problem to be considered. 
It is the objective of this report to bring about a better understanding of 
the problems of economic control in the fluid milk industry by analyzing the 
efforts made by legislators to alter existing situations for the welfare of all or 
of certain groups. The opportunities for competition have been obstructed in 
this field of activity as in many others, and as a result competition has been 
prevented from accomplishing its supposed objectives.  In asking for controls 
the producers' associations and large dealers sought to eliminate several forms 
of competition that were commonly called "chiseling," "bootlegging," or 
"cut-rate competition." 
The manner in which these controls have eliminated or attempted to 
eliminate such demoralizing practices in the several markets will be presented 
in the subsequent analysis of state and municipal economic and sanitary 
controls that have been applied to the fluid milk industry from the time the 
first milk law was passed in 1856.  At that time the United States had a 
population of approximately 30,000,000 which was supplied with milk from 
approximately 8,500,000 dairy cows, or one cow to every 3.5 persons. Today, 
with hundreds of milk laws in effect and the milk industry being classed by 
many as one needing public utility regulation, we have more than 25,000,000 
dairy cows to supply 131,409,881 people, or one cow for every 5.2 inhabitants. 
Even though we had a tremendous increase in population in that 85-year 
period, the significant change and one of the chief causes of the predicament 
of the fluid milk industry in the early 1930's was the fact that urban popula­
tion increased from 21 per cent in 1860 to 56 per cent in 1930. 
Emphasis is placed on state milk control laws that have been applied to 
the milk industry, especially with reference to the mechanical operation of 
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the laws, price controls affecting consumers and producers, provisions for 
equalizing payments to producers, and the success in administering the laws. 
We have now had in the United States about 8 years' experience with this 
sort of regulation ; we can therefore better evaluate the various features of 
such regulation. 
The early milk laws prior to the crisis of 1929 had a definite social 
aspect attached to them in that they attempted through sanitary regulations 
to prevent unwholesome milk from entering consumption channels, whereas 
the more recent legislation, resulting to some extent from increasing sanitary 
regulations, is primarily of an economic nature promoted for the sole pur­
pose of bettering the economic status or of maintaining the status quo for a 
particular group in the milk industry. Whether the regulations are primarily 
social or economic, legal controls are usually justified on the premise that 
milk is a necessity. 
The value of milk as a food has been known to scientists a great number 
of years.  The first public acclaim made relative to the importance of milk as 
a human food by a member of the judicial fraternity was in 1914.  Justice 
Dunn of the Illinois Supreme Court rendering a decision on pasteurization 
said, "There is no article of food in more general use than milk ; none whose 
impurity or unwholesomeness may more quickly, more widely, and more 
seriously affect the health of those who use it.  The regulation of its sale is 
an imperative duty that has been universally recognized." (24) 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF SANITARY REGULATION 
It is significant that prior to 1933 state regulation of prices in the dairy 
industry was unknown.  Regulation in the distribution and handling of milk 
centered almost entirely around questions of health and sanitation. 
The first law on milk in this country was a Massachusetts act of 1856 
prohibiting the adulteration of milk.  Similar legislation followed in Wash­
ington, D. C. in 1871, and in Illinois in 1879. A Boston regulation is said to 
have prevented the use of distillery slops for feeding cattle and to have 
appointed an inspector to enforce this requirement.  Minnesota passed a 
comprehensive dairy inspection law in 1895.  The city of Chicago in 1908 
passed an ordinance requiring pasteurization of all milk except from tubercu­
lin tested cattle, followed by New York City in 1914 requiring pasteurization 
of all milk except certified.  In the same year a sanitation control act was 
passed in New York.  (24) 
A court decision in Massachusetts in 1860 in the case of the Common­
wealth vs. Flannelly was the first to be handed down in the United States 11  ECONOMIC CONTROL OF THE MARKET MILK INDUSTRY 
concerning milk.  This case did not invalidate the law of 1856, but the court 
held that knowledge of adulteration by the seller must be shown in order to 
prosecute him, and since it was not shown, he was not guilty.  This decision 
was reversed four years later in which case the Commonwealth was the plain­
tiff.  The court upheld the conviction of a milk dealer for adulteration of his 
milk regardless of his knowledge or ignorance of the adulteration.  James A. 
Tobey in his book, "Legal Aspects of Milk Control," lists 258 court decisions 
up to 1936, the majority of them dealing with the sanitary aspects of milk 
control. 
Some of the more recent legislation and court decisions are interesting 
in that they indicate the socialized trend being followed by legislators and the 
courts.  These decisions stress the welfare of the public over that of the 
individual.  The first case directly involving milk control to come up before 
the United States Supreme Court was that of Fisher vs. St. Louis in 1904. 
The issue was whether a municipal ordinance requiring permits for the estab­
lishment of dairies in the city was or was not in contravention of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.  Fisher, a dairyman, 
contended that he had been denied due process of law and the equal protec­
tion of the laws as guaranteed to him by this amendment.  The Supreme 
Court of Missouri upheld his conviction and the case was then appealed to 
the highest court of the land, which affirmed this decision.  Other Supreme 
Court cases came up in 1905 and 1907 relating to sanitary control over milk. 
The city of Milwaukee in 1913 was allowed to confiscate milk that came from 
outside sources and milk from cows not tuberculin tested. 
Between 1914 and 1934, courts in ten states sustained the validity of 
laws, ordinances, and regulations requiring the pasteurization of all or part 
of the market milk supply in accordance with methods approved by health 
authorities.  (25)  In only one case has there been an adverse decision ren­
dered on state or municipal pasteurization rules.  This case came up in 
Missouri (State vs. Kinsey, 1926), in which it was held from the evidence 
submitted that raw milk is better than pasteurized milk.  Late in 1935 a 
municipal ordinance in Santa Rosa, California, prohibited the sale of pas­
teurized milk within the city unless it had been pasteurized within the city 
limits.  This action was upheld as a valid exercise of the police power by a 
district court of appeal in California (LaFranchi vs. City of Santa Rosa). 
As a result of other recent cases, dairymen must submit their cattle to 
tuberculin testing in the interests of public welfare ; a milk dealer is held 
liable for a case of undulant fever caused by his milk supply in that there is 
an implied warranty of the wholesomeness of a food sold by a dealer for 
immediate domestic use; a city may prohibit milk from within its limits oral­12  OREGON STATE COLLEGESTUDIES IN ECONOMICS 
on the ground that it is dangerous to health and not merely on the indefensible 
ground of distance ; and cities may license dairies and pasteurizing plants and 
charge license fees. A highly significant decision was handed down by the 
New Jersey Supreme Court in 1935 in the case of Sheffield Farms vs. Seaman 
regarding the rights of milk dealers in obtaining licenses and the limitation of 
the powers of a health department.  In this case the health authorities of the 
city of Perth Amboy had refused to grant a permit to a qualified dealer to sell 
milk merely for the alleged reasons that there was already an adequate supply 
of milk in the city, and that the health department did not wish the added 
burden and expense of further regulation and control of milk.  (25)  The 
court dismissed the case in that the control by the health authorities was arbi­
trary and inequitable. 
These same powers used by the health authorities in the foregoing case 
are used by many states for the purpose of restricting the milk market to 
home producers.  The most striking examples of sanitary regulations being 
used as trade barriers between states can be found by studying the milkshed 
problems of several of the New England and Atlantic Coast states.  (21) 
An illuminating situation of this type of market restriction is presented by 
Thurman Arnold of the antitrust division of the Department of Justice in 
his report on the Chicago milk case.  (1) Indictfnents have been issued 
against many farmers, officials, and laborers within the Chicago milk market. 
The case is still pending. Mr. Arnold writes, 
"There (Chicago) we found a combination of farmers, large dairy com­
panies, a labor union, and members of the Board of Health, was forcing upon the
poor a luxury system of distribution. This system consisted in leaving quart
bottles at their doorsteps.  It was enforced by boycotting distribution of milk by 
stores.  The system was also used to create a milkshed around Chicago shaped
like a sausage.  Farmers two hundred miles away, who were within this pri­
vately-controlled milkshed, could get their milk into Chicago. Farmers who were
much closer to Chicago were unable to sell their milk in the city limits.  The 
indictment charged that this trade barrier was maintained by the use of an in­
spection law by the Board of Health.  Farmers who were not in the favored 
group found it impossible to get their farms inspected." 
Such instances as illustrated are examples of how states and munici­
palities can disguise a health measure into a plan to discriminate economically 
against certain groups.  Sanitary regulations are the principal legal weapons 
used by municipalities to control the supply of milk by raising the require­
ments, if thought necessary. The multitude of contravening state, municipal, 
and county sanitary and inspection requirements for milk, especially in the 
larger milksheds, has created additional problems for the dairyman caught 
in this strangling network of regulations.  Perhaps the individual laws are 
not intentionally designed to control supply, but in his compliance with all 13  ECONOMIC CONTROL OF THE MARKET MILK INDUSTRY 
the requirements a dairyman may eventually be forced out of business 
because the income from his sales will not cover his cost of production. An 
illustration of this can be found in the report of the Federal Trade Commis­
sion on the Connecticut and Philadelphia milksheds.  (28) One distributor 
who shipped milk to several cities and states claimed to be subjected to 57 
different inspections, and many farmers complained of similar experiences. 
Although these may be extreme cases, nevertheless they do indicate the need 
for a uniform milk ordinance for states and cities. 
The great majority of the members in the dairy industry are without 
doubt in favor of a uniform milk ordinance.  It has been suggested by many 
of the leaders in the industry that the United States Public Health Service 
ordinance be adopted in all the states and cities.  In a recent survey it was 
found that of 2,651 cities reporting, 36 per cent had a milk ordinance and 
one-fourth of these were using the Public Health Service Ordinance.  (12) 
These cities were located within thirty-two states. 
Even though sanitation controls have been used indiscriminately in many 
instances, it is doubtful whether the public would tolerate lessening the sani­
tary regulations over the dairy industry.  It is an interesting fact that even 
with supposedly stringent sanitation controls there was an annual average of 
1,625 cases of milk-borne diseases in this country from 1924 to 1934.  (24) 
Of this number, a yearly average of forty-three deaths resulted, which should 
be good and sufficient reason for continued vigilance over milk sanitation by 
health officials and producers. 
ECONOMIC MALADJUSTMENT: FORERUNNER TO
 
ECONOMIC REGULATIONS
 
In each of the state statutes sanitary regulations of milk are justified on 
the grounds that milk is the most valuable food of man and thus directly 
affects public welfare.  Economic regulations through price controls are 
justified on the grounds that certain groups have a vested interest in the milk 
industry and as such deserve to receive a just and reasonable share of the 
consumer's dollar in equitable proportion to their costs.  Public welfare, 
through stabilization of the milk industry, is considered to a lesser extent. 
Prior to the crisis of 1929, the milk industry enjoyed the "let-alone" phil­
osophy with the belief that unlimited freedom of competition as it then func­
tioned in business and industry would create efficiency of operation, eliminate 
wasteful business practices, and best serve the public welfare.  The several 
groups in the industry appeared to be working harmoniously, although an 
analysis of eastern milk markets by Cassels indicates that the monopoly ele­14  OREGON STATE COLLEGESTUDIES IN ECONOMICS 
ment in producer prices between 1920 and 1929 in the larger eastern milk-
sheds was well established.  This monopoly price arose partly from the re­
strictions associated with city health inspection and partly from the bargain­
ing power of cooperative organizations of fluid milk producers.  (4)  Al­
though occasional disagreements arose, strikes and violence were rare. 
The depression following the crisis of 1929 produced a discouraging 
picture of economic maladjustment in industry and agriculture. The general 
economic conditions at the time, especially as they affected agriculture,  were 
more instrumental than were conditions peculiar to the fluid milk business in 
bringing on the chaos that followed.  Prices paid producers for milk going 
into the cities reached a depressing low in 1932 and 1933, but this drop  was 
preceded by an even more precipitous fall in other farm prices, especially 
manufactured dairy productsbutter, cheese, and evaporated milk.  In fact, 
this latter condition was largely responsible for the conditions in the fluid 
milk market.  As a result of this disparity between the prices received for 
milk going into manufactured dairy products and for that used for fluid  con­
sumption, a great number of producer-distributors who formerly sold their 
milk for manufacturing purposes appeared in the markets almost overnight. 
In order to get business, these new distributors cut prices below those that 
normally prevailed.  Many consumers whose incomes had been reduced re­
sponded to price reductions with the result that "price-cutting" had a demor­
alizing effect on the whole market.  In the attempt to hold their trade, the old 
distributors answered by meeting the price cuts and passing all or part of the 
reduction back to the producers.  Disturbances followed, which in some cases 
led to farmer strikes and, as Mr. Mortenson states, "a method of picketing 
which could not be characterized as 'peaceful'." (16) 
With the fluid milk market in turmoil and many people forced out of 
their businesses, the starting of a small milk distributing company appealed 
to some as a means of making a living.  The returns were fairly satisfactory 
because many distributors found they could pass the burden of their  un­
economic competitive practices, or a large part of it, on to producers.  With 
the lack of alternative economic opportunities for capital and labor an over­
expansion of distribution facilities resulted.  These overexpanded distribu­
tion facilities still have to be maintained in many of our markets today. (6) 
Consumption declined perceptibly during the depression.  This was an­
other economic factor that had a direct effect on the price that producers 
received for their milk.  The United States per capita consumption of milk 
reached a high in 1929 of 163.2 quarts and dropped severely to  a low of 
144.4 quarts in 1934.  (15)  The per capita milk and cream consumption has 15  ECONOMIC CONTROL OF THE MARKET MILK INDUSTRY 
barely held its own in the past 10 years in our cities and towns, and in some 
markets it has decreased noticeably.  (16) Dr. Tinley, in his report on milk 
marketing in California, states, "It is significant that per capita consumption 
continued to decline in the face of this very material decline in the prices at 
which consumers purchased milk.  This strengthens the argument that the 
prevailing level of buying power is the most important single factor influenc­
ing the level of per capita consumption of milk over a period of time." (23) 
There are other factors besides the level of buying power that influence con­
sumption such as the buying habits of people and the competition from other 
products, especially canned milk (6), and the fact that butterfat can be 
obtained more cheaply in the form of butter than in the form of milk. 
Another factor influencing consumption of fluid milk is the age structure 
of our population.  Dairymen are aware that our population is changing, 
that we have a greater percentage of older people and a smaller percentage 
of younger people than we had in the past.  According to Dr. 0. E. Baker 
of the U. S. Department of Agriculture, 
"The 1940 census will show about 11% fewer children under ten years of age in 
the nation than were reported in 1930." 
* * * 
"  .  .  . the decline in children has already reduced materially the market for milk 
below what it would have been had former trends persisted." (8) 
With the dairy farmer's income at a lower level than that reached during 
the agricultural depression period of 1922, the dairy farmer during the de­
pression period tried to maintain his predepression income by adding more 
dairy cows to his herd, hoping to retrieve his total net income by producing a 
larger quantity of milk for sale at lower unit prices.  This increased produc­
tion aggravated still further the depressed milk market.  Price-cutting, mis­
representation of product, bribery, and special inducements were not un­
common. A significant change was also taking place at the time in the 
methods of distribution. A marked shift from home delivery of milk to 
sales through stores occurred in the larger markets with the idea of moving 
off the surplus milk at a lower price permitted by a cheaper method of dis­
tribution.  In order to develop or to maintain sales to stores, distributors 
gradually lowered their list prices and hence their margins to stores, and 
also granted quantity discounts and secret rebates below the list prices. (23) 
There were other reasons why production increased.  The dairyman 
found that he could get the best price for his feed by marketing it as fluid 
milk, because the prices on dairy products, especially fluid milk prices, did 
not drop as severely as prices on other agricultural commodities.  Increased 
production because of low feed values was taking place even in the 1920 to 
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With the dairy farmer trying to regain his income by increasing pro­
duction, he was faced with the problem of maintaining sanitation require­
ments, which were increasing his costs of production.  It is estimated that 
those producers required to operate under the United States Public Health 
Service Ordinance have had their cost of production increased from $200 to 
$800 by complying with the requirements.  (14)  There was considerable 
opposition in the Chicago milkshed during 1941 to the Chicago City Council's 
proposal to levy an assessment on dairy farmers of about 11 cents per hun­
dred pounds of milk to pay for inspection of their farms under direction of 
the Chicago Health Department.  It is estimated that it would cost the aver­
age farmer $15 a year ; some farmers would pay more than $100.  (9) 
It can be seen from the foregoing discussion of the economic maladjust­
ments that accrued in the milk industry during the depths of the depression 
and the ensuing adjustment period that the producers were the members of 
the industry who were hit the hardest with increasing costs on the one hand 
and depressing prices on the other.  In many markets the distributors man­
aged to maintain their spreads during the whole depression period ; if they 
were required to cut prices in order to meet competition, they deducted their 
costs from the lowered returns and passed the rest on to the producers. The 
rigidity and amount of distributor spreads has resulted in recent probes into 
many of the larger markets by the Federal Trade Commission and antitrust 
division of the Justice Department. 
The consumers fared badly in most of the larger markets.  Some felt 
that they benefited through the price-cutting period in that they could get 
their milk cheaper, but in many instances they found that milk was not de­
livered regularly as the result of strikes and those who most needed the milk 
could not get it at double the price. 
Although there were producer-cooperative bargaining associations in 
most milk markets, they were unable to resist the price declines.  In the 
markets where they were strongest the producer associations tried to bring 
about a conciliatory settlement with the distributors by getting the distributors 
to agree that they would pay certain set prices for the several classes of milk. 
These "shotgun" agreements were only temporary because of the absence of 
complete cooperation within the industry. 
ERA OF ECONOMIC REGULATION 
In the depression years of 1932 and 1933, conditions had come to such a 
state that producers were fighting producers but mostly distributors, while 
distributors were arrayed against distributors as well as producers. A condi­17  ECONOMIC CONTROL OF THE MARKET MILK INDUSTRY 
tion of universal distrust prevailed in most markets among the several ele­
ments of the fluid milk industry.  Finally, with the situation completely out 
of hand, producers and the large distributors sought governmental assistance 
to aid in stabilizing the markets.  Producers were especially desperate in ask­
ing for aidtheir margins between costs and sales were very meager and in 
many cases they were fortunate to have a favorable margin.  It was during 
this period that price fixing at higher price levels became a popular cry for 
both industry and agriculture.  The urge that the government act and act 
quickly became more general and more widespread. The State and Federal 
Governments began considering various proposals to bring about reform in 
the milk markets. 
Considerable rivalry exists among a few of the states as to which state 
was the first to act with its police power to protect the public welfare by 
attempting to bring about a reconciliation of the elements in the milk markets 
and especially alleviating the pressure on the producer by stabilizing producer 
prices at higher levels.  According to Tinley, "The Director of Agriculture 
acting under the terms of the provisions of the State Market Commission 
Act of 1916, agreed in January, 1932, upon request of producers and dis­
tributors in the San Francisco market to assist in stabilizing producer and 
resale prices in that market.  The Los Angeles milk market petitioned the 
Governor in August, 1932, to interfere in the chaotic market situation. The 
board set a price to producers and endeavored to maintain resale prices by 
negotiation.  This arrangement was continued until supplanted by the Fed­
eral Agreement in 1933."  (23)  Wisconsin promulgated an order on the 
Milwaukee market effective December 1,  1932, under provisions in their 
statute prohibiting unfair methods of competition.  (7)  In this same year 
the Pitcher Committee was appointed in New York to study the milk prob­
lem and recommend legislation.  (2)  These three states were no doubt the 
first ones to start the movement of state milk control legislation.  Other 
states were considering measures at this time, but many of them did not get 
into action until the following year and later.  Altogether twenty-six states 
have passed milk control legislation.  Only nineteen acts are in effect at 
present. 
The Federal Government entered the field of regulating the dairy indus­
try about the same time that the states were promulgating the original milk 
control laws. The passage of the Agricultural Adjustment Act in May, 1933, 
gave the Secretary of Agriculture power to enter into marketing agreements 
with producers and distributors of farm products engaged in handling, in 
interstate or foreign commerce, any agricultural commodity or product 
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agreements or orders in effect, but at present only 27 markets are being 
regulated.  The state and Federal legislation that was passed during the 
1930's was designed to stabilize and protect the dairy industry ; actually, how­
ever, the fluid milk branch of the industry received the major benefits from 
such control.  The Agricultural Adjustment Act specifically stated that it 
was the objective of the law to bring the farmers' incomes back to parity, 
using the 1909-1914 period as the base period. Handlers or distributors were 
not given a great deal of attention. 
Figure 1 indicates the states in which milk control laws are in effect at 
the present time and those states where the laws have been declared uncon­
stitutional or allowed to terminate.  The figure also shows the marketing 
areas in which Federal agreements or orders are now in effect.  In several 
of the states where milk control laws are in operation, Federal marketing 
agreements or orders are also in effect.  The Federal regulations are found 
in the large cities where the milkshed extends into several states or in the 
medium sized cities that are located near state borders and are naturally 
supplied with milk from the neighboring states.  In these cases the Federal 
Government has usually been called in by the producers in the milk industry 
and state officials to enforce an agreement or order in a particular market, 
because of the large quantity of milk that enters that market in interstate 
commerce. 
The majority of the states that have milk control laws in effect at present 
have made provisions in their laws for cooperation of the state agency with 
other authorized agencies and with the Federal authorities for the purpose of 
effectuating uniform milk control.  Only Wisconsin, Louisiana, and Maine 
have omitted such provisions from within their laws ; Louisiana, however, 
has carried out the spirit of cooperation by enacting like orders, comple­
mentary to those that have been placed in effect by Federal authorities in the 
New Orleans and Shreveport markets.  In practically every case where state 
milk control laws and the Federal regulations are likely to conflict an arrange­
ment has been reached whereby the state enacts an order complementary to 
the Federal order.  Similar action has taken place in the Fort Wayne and 
La Porte markets in Indiana, in the Lowell-Lawrence market in Massachu­
setts, and in the New York City market.  The state order is necessary to 
regulate the production and distribution of intrastate milk.  In the case of 
Baldwin vs. Seelig (1935), 294, U. S. 511, the United States Supreme Court 
established the limits on the commerce that the individual states and the Fed­
eral Government can respectively regulate.  The court held that New York 
authorities could not prohibit the sale of milk in the state of New York that 
was bought at a lower price from out-of-state producers than that required 
to be paid to producers within the state of New York. c...(4  \
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In addition to the cooperation provision in most of the state milk control 
laws a protective provision is also included whereby the state will extend the 
regulation of milk marketing to the extent allowed by the constitution of the 
state and the United States.  All states have this savings clause within their 
law except California, Connecticut, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Oregon, and 
Wisconsin. 
With approximately 8 years of experience in regulating the fluid milk 
industry through price maintenance by the states, an analysis of the milk 
control acts of the states will give a better insight as to how these agencies 
have attempted to correct the evils discussed. The majority of the laws have 
been amended a number of times in order to correct certain practices that 
have arisen since the passage of the original act or that were overlooked at 
the beginning.  In many cases much of the original legislation has been com­
pletely overhauled and much of it discarded. 
The following analysis of the state regulations should be helpful to many 
individuals and regulatory groups that are interested in improving existing 
laws. 
ANALYSIS OF THE STATE MILK CONTROL ACTS* 
DEVELOPMENT OF STATE MILK CONTROL LAWS 
Milk control laws were effective as of May 1, 1941, in Alabama, Cali­
fornia, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Massa­
chusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
The state legislators' justification for state milk control laws is almost 
identical in each instance. One state may stress demoralizing trade practices, 
another public health and welfare, or the dangerous condition of the credit 
structure of the state.  On close scrutiny and analysis it is evident that the 
major objective of each of the laws was to give the producer of milk a larger 
share of the consumer's dollar ;  it is not difficult to see, therefore, that the 
producers were the driving force behind all the state laws. 
The New York law was one of the early laws to be passed, and it has 
been the basis of the majority of other state laws that are now in effect. The 
legislative findings and statement of policy of the New York law declared that 
its purposes were to protect the public health and public welfare.  This pro­
tection was to be accomplished by means of state regulation of the economic 
activities of the producers and dealers. 
* Material for this section has been obtained almost entirely from papers 1 through
14, Series on State Milk Control Acts, Dairy Section, Agricultural Adjustment Admin­
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In 1934, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Virginia en­
acted milk control legislation.  In the meantime, Texas and Utah (2) had 
made some effort to set up local control agencies in cities under enabling 
statutes ; and West Virginia had made use of general powers of its Depart­
ment of Agriculture to create a "State Milk Board" in May, 1934.  In the 
meantime, also, the governors of three states, Illinois, Louisiana, and Mich­
igan, had vetoed milk control bills.  Bills had also been introduced into the 
legislatures of Delaware and South Carolina.  Legislative proposals had 
been prepared by groups in Kentucky, New Hampshire, and Colorado.  By 
1935, bills had been introduced or at least promoted in two-thirds of the re­
maining states, with the following enacting the bills into law :  Alabama, 
California, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Montana, New Hampshire, South 
Dakota, and Vermont.  Since that time the South Dakota law has become 
inoperative, and the Maryland law was declared invalid.  Legislatures rejected 
bills in the following states :  Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, 
Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, and Tennessee.  Of this group 
Georgia enacted a law in the 1937 legislature that is still in effect, and Mich­
igan finally managed to pass a milk control law in the 1939 legislature.  This 
law was recently declared unconstitutional in the Supreme Court of Mich­
igan (Milk Board vs. Johnson) on the grounds that the Board was granted 
rate-making power, which is an act that is legislative and not judicial in kind. 
Louisiana established a milk commission during the 1938 session of the 
legislature. 
The State of Washington designed a law in 1934 almost identical to the 
AAA of the Federal Government, declaring milk and seven other commodi­
ties as "basic." The law has been declared invalid. 
All of the early laws, except those enacted in Connecticut and California, 
were so-called "emergency" measures designed to cure the acute pains that 
were occurring in the milk markets at that time. The majority of the states 
drafted the legislation for a period of 2 years with the hope that the existing 
economic emergency would be no longer in existence and the milk industry 
could cure its own ills thereafter.  Provisions were made that the acts would 
expire at the end of the 2-year period, but only one act (Ohio) has been 
allowed to terminate since its enactment.  Only five states designed their 
milk control legislation on a permanent basis from the beginning.  Those 
states are California, Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine, and Oregon. On the 
other hand, only five states remainGeorgia, Indiana, Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, and Wisconsinthat do not have permanent laws at present.  The 
laws of these states all expire this year (1941), but it is quite probable that 
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made into a permanent law.  The Wisconsin Department of Agriculture can 
discontinue the enforcement of the law whenever it determines that economic 
conditions of the industry no longer interfere with production, distribution, 
and consumption of milk so as to constitute a threat to public health and 
welfare. 
Those states that had passed the Milk Control Act as a temporary 
measure to be in effect only for a year or two found at the end of the desig­
nated time that the law, because of its imperfections and the huge task as­
signed to the administrative body, had not accomplished the desired results. 
Disparity of prices between milk and other commodities was not as great as 
before, but should the legislators allow the law to be discarded the producer 
had no guarantee that his welfare would be safeguarded by other members 
of the industry.  From the experiences that occurred in certain markets 
when regulation ceased, the lawmakers felt that the laws had to be extended 
or be made permanent in order to protect the public welfare and prevent the 
recurrence of conditions as they existed in the milk markets during the 
depths of the depression. 
The following excerpt from the 1939 amendment to the Florida law, 
which as a result became a permanent act,  is an illustration of what the 
majority of legislators feared would happen if controls were removed : 
"Such practices (destructive and unfair manipulation of prices) were and are
curtailed by the existence of said board, but will immediately recur should said
board and the regulation set up to be administered thereby pass out of existence 
.  .  .  that the danger to the public health and welfare is immediate and impend­
ing, the necessity urgent and such as will not admit of interruption in public
supervision and control  .  .  .  " 
PRODUCT TO BE CONTROLLED
 
Each state defines the product or products it intends to control.  Cali­
fornia, Connecticut, Montana, Maine, and Oregon define milk as fluid milk 
and cream for human consumption.  Louisiana uses the same qualifications 
but adds several limitations in the way of sanitary requirements, such as 
adulteration, milk from diseased cows, unsanitary handling, etc.  Alabama, 
Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin make provisions for regulation of butter­
milk and skimmed milk in addition to fluid milk and cream.  Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, and Rhode Island use fluid milk, cream, skim milk or but­
termilk, fresh, sour, or stored, irrespective of whether flavored or not. 
Florida, Georgia, Indiana, New York, and Pennsylvania extend their restric­
tion further by adding ice cream mix, condensed or concentrated whole or 
skim milk except in hermetically sealed cans or containers.  Indiana and New 
York are the only states extending their control over the manufacture of 
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ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF CONTROL AGENCIES 
Fourteen of the agencies have some connection with the state departments 
of agriculture, either by being within the department of agriculture, having 
the commissioner or director of agriculture a member of the agency, or re­
ceiving assistance from the department in carrying out the provisions of the 
act.  (Table 2, Appendix.) Each state, California, Massachusetts, New York, 
and Wisconsin has its control agency within the Department of Agriculture 
under the direction of the Commissioner or Director of Agriculture.  Florida, 
Indiana, Louisiana, and Vermont provide that the Commissioner of Agricul­
ture shall be a member of the control agency. Montana makes provision for 
the executive officer of the Montana Livestock Sanitary Board to be a mem­
ber of the control board, whereas Oregon fits into this category by requiring 
that the Director of Agriculture or his representative be the executive secre­
tary of the board.  Maine, Rhode Island, and Virginia make provisions for 
technical services to be obtained from their respective agricultural depart­
ments.  In the recent amendment to the Georgia Act, the milk control board 
was removed from within the Department of Agriculture and established as 
an independent agency.  The same action occurred in the state of Rhode 
Island since the original act was passed, but the Director of the Department 
of Agriculture and Conservation is a member of the Milk Control Board. 
Alabama, Connecticut, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania 
have no connections between their milk control agencies and state agricul­
tural departments. 
Membership.  Connecticut provides for an administrator aided by 
two deputies.  Seven states have a control agency consisting of three mem­
bers ; one state has four members and the other four states have a member­
ship of five in their agencies.  In the states of California and New York the 
Director of the Division of Milk Control is selected by the Commissioner of 
Agriculture and Markets. The Wisconsin Director of Agriculture is also the 
head of the milk control division.  In all other states the members on the 
agency are appointed by the governor, usually for a period of from 2 to 4 
years, and removable at his discretion.  The membership of the control 
division in a few of the states consists of other state officials holding another 
office. 
Oregon has the most unique limitations with respect to membership of 
any state.  They specify that none of the three members shall be in any way 
connected with the dairy industry and there shall be one member appointed 
from each congressional district.  Although called a board, Oregon's control 
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resents the public point of view entirely and has no representatives of private 
interest groups in its fold.  Eleven states call their control agency a board, 
four a commission, and one a milk administration.  The other three states' 
agencies are within the Division of Agriculture and Markets.  Pennsylvania 
requires that its three members be citizens and voters within the state, as does 
Massachusetts.  Connecticut provides that its administrator shall have been 
a producer 2 years prior to receiving his position.  Florida and Virginia 
specify that one of the members shall be in no way connected with the milk 
business.  Vermont requires the appointment biennially of a citizen ; New 
Hampshire states that no more than two of its three members shall be from 
the same political party.  Alabama, Georgia, Montana, New Jersey, and 
Rhode Island require that one member be a consumer.  Ten states require 
producers to be on the board, with Georgia, Louisiana, and Indiana requiring 
two.  Eight states require distributors to be represented, with Indiana requir­
ing two.  Only six states specify that producer-distributors be included ; 
Georgia requires two, one to be from a cooperative and one a store licensee. 
Compensation. Thirteen of the states provide that the appointed mem­
bers of their control agencies receive a per diem varying from $5 in Montana 
and California ( for members of the local control boards), to $15 in Rhode 
Island and Indiana.  The majority of the states pay a per diem of $10 and 
traveling expenses for every day on duty.  Oregon limits the total monthly 
per diem pay each member can receive to $150.  In Maine the Governor 
determines the per diem, and in Virginia the Governor determines the pay 
of its commission members.  Florida does not pay its members but allows 
them traveling expenses and limits the director's salary to $3,600 yearly. 
Pennsylvania is the only state that pays a yearly salary to its membersthe 
chairman receives $6,500 and the others $6,000, but no member can hold 
another position.  The persons working on milk control in New York, 
California, and Wisconsin receive regular salaries as members of their re­
spective state departments of agriculture. 
Local milk boards. A few of the states provide for local committees 
to function within designated market areas to aid the milk control agency in 
enforcing the orders and regulations issued.  These committees are probably 
more helpful at the beginning in helping the control agency establish equitable 
producer prices, and resale and wholesale prices where used.  If satisfactory 
prices and trade regulations are established at first, the subsequent job of 
enforcement is greatly reduced.  California has probably the most advanced 
provisions for local committees ; in fact, it gives the Director of Agriculture 
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ing area.  One committee of seven is to be composed strictly of producers 
and the other local board is to have seven members, but membership is di­
vided, with three distributors, one producer-distributor, one consumer, and 
two retail storekeepers being represented.  Evidently one board is to aid the 
Director in establishing equitable producer prices, and the other to make sure 
that fair resale and wholesale prices are scheduled.  Alabama has no pro­
vision for local boards, but in several of their markets such boards are func­
tioning.  The Montana board may foster in each market area a local board 
composed of all licensees to aid the board in various matters ; provisions are 
made that the local board may receive for its expenses up to 10 per cent of 
all fees collected.  Indiana also gives the state board power to set up local 
control committees but specifies that the membership shall be selected from 
the producers and distributors serving the particular market. The New York 
law allows the Division of Agriculture and Markets to select an advisory 
committee of from 11 to 15 members for a particular market, at least 5 of the 
members being either producers or distributors.  Virginia is also making 
use of local committees composed of 5 members that are subordinate to the 
regular state milk commission. Two are producers, two represent distributors, 
and the chairman is a consumer representative. 
Source of financing.  State milk control agencies are financed by four 
methods.  In some cases only one method of financing is used while in others 
various combinations of the four may be employed.  The methods are : 
(1) licensing dealers and in some states producers, stores, and others ;  (2) 
direct appropriations from the state treasury ;  (3) collection of assessment 
fees imposed upon the members of the industry ; and (4) the monies collected 
as fines against violators. 
The most common system is that of licensing dealers.  This method is 
used for a twofold purpose in most states ;  that is, for financing and as a 
means of enforcing the several provisions of the regulations or orders relating 
to the marketing of market milk.  Some states levy special assessments in 
addition to license fees to cover the cost of services performed by the state 
agency for members of the industry. 
Besides the license fees and other fees charged dealers, producers, pro­
ducer-distributors, and peddlers, Florida requires that all solicitors, route 
salesmen, and milk truck drivers pay a license fee of $1 yearly. New Jersey 
has a provision that upon applying for a license any dealer or processor must 
deposit $100 with the Board until the regular fee is determined.  In addition 
to the fees required, Montana also requires that all producer-distributors and 
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Virginia producers and stores selling milk for consumption off the premises 
are considered distributors and must pay the required assessment fee of not 
more than 4 cents per 100 pounds of milk handled though no specific mention 
is made on the matter. 
Louisiana is the only state that meets the entire expenses of the state 
milk commission by direct appropriations from the general fund of the state 
($25,000 per annum).  Other states are appropriating money to cover the 
balance not received from fee collections. New York appropriated $220,000 
in 1937 for the expenses of the milk control work.  Five states provide in 
their laws that expenses shall not exceed revenues of their respective control 
agencies. 
Three state milk control laws specify that all monies collected from pen­
alties as fines shall be used to help defray expenses of their agencies. 
POWERS OF THE CONTROL AGENCY 
Table 2, Appendix, lists the general powers of the control agency which 
are usually the powers to supervise and regulate the milk industry and the 
methods by which marketing areas are established within the individual 
states.  Table 1, Appendix, outlines the more specific powers relative to in­
vestigations, licensing, bonding, regulation of unfair trade practices, media­
tion, and the limitations and exceptions of these particular powers. 
General powers. An illustration of the general powers given a control 
agency to regulate and supervise the milk industry is this excerpt from the 
Montana act :  "The Board is hereby vested with the powers, and it shall be 
its duty to supervise, regulate, and control the fluid milk industry of the State 
of Montana, including the production, transportation, processing, storage, 
distribution, and sale of milk in the state of Montana for consumption within 
the State  .  .  .  " The majority of states have similarly worded powers given 
their control agencies. 
Designation of marketing areas. The manner in which market areas 
are established or designated in the several states depends on the powers 
granted the control agencies by the legislators. A natural marketing area 
is necessary in order to obtain uniformity in prices and practices, but in many 
states these powers have been used to restrict supplies of milk from a market 
where the problem of surplus milk causes the greatest difficulties.  In each of 
the nineteen states the control agency may take the initiative in setting up or 
establishing the particular marketing area.  Three of the states make no 
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act that the agency may adopt, promulgate, and enforce all rules and orders 
necessary to carry out the provisions of the act.  Six states give their control 
agencies the power to act on their own initiative and own motion in carrying 
out the provisions of the acts, which include designating marketing areas 
without requiring a petition from members in the market or a majority ap­
proval.  These states have permission to promulgate their rules and regula­
tions anywhere in the state. 
Marketing areas are not set up in most states until after public notice 
and a public hearing is held in the area.  If the members of the industry were 
not in favor of such a proposal and the marketing area were established 
without their consent, the enforcement problem would be difficult.  Recent 
amendments have eliminated the "consent" feature from the New Hampshire 
and Vermont lawsi.e., that the agency cannot operate within a particular 
market without first being petitioned by a certain percentage of volume or 
number of members in the market. Wisconsin specifies that the Department 
of Agriculture and Markets on its own initiative or on written petition may 
act by establishing "regulated" milk markets and prescribing such terms and 
conditions as will tend to eliminate any unfair methods of competition or 
unfair trade practices that may exist in the particular market. Two states, 
Indiana and Massachusetts, may act on their own initiative in designating 
market areas and may prescribe provisions of the order except the conditions 
of the sale of milk in wholesale or retail channels.  In Indiana wholesale and 
retail prices are set only when an "emergency" is declared to exist in the 
market and the action is requested by distributors and producer-distributors. 
In Massachusetts resale prices cannot be established unless petitioned by 25 
per cent of the producers within the market, and once the prices are estab­
lished the board may keep or withdraw the prices without petition.  Rhode 
Island has a somewhat similar provision in its law, except that in setting 
minimum prices to producers a request by 51 per cent of the producers in the 
market must be made and the same percentage may terminate such an action. 
The Florida act states that the Board is required to withdraw from a market 
upon petition of 51 per cent by volume and number of producers in the 
market. 
Alabama, California, Montana, and Virginia provide that before regula­
tions are in effect in the particular market a certain percentage of those 
affected must give their approval.  California provides that the marketing 
plan for fluid milk or cream shall be formulated by the Director of Agricul­
ture and Markets and then after public notice and hearings 65 per cent or 
more of producers by number and volume must approve before the plan is in 
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ment, and the Director may terminate the agreement after notice and a public 
hearing.  Alabama has somewhat similar provisions but allows producer-dis­
tributors and distributors as well as producers (all counted as one group) to 
present a majority request for the board to exercise its powers in that market. 
A limitation is placed on the members by requiring them to be operating 
under a permit from the State Board of Health or the County Board of 
Health.  Once the board has established itself in a market it cannot be forced 
to vacate but may do so on its own initiative. 
Georgia has a somewhat different regulation relative to designation of 
milksheds.  After the board designates a milkshed, an election has to be held 
to determine whether the rules promulgated by the board are to be effective. 
Each producer, producer-distributor, and distributor having a permit from 
the municipality or county allowing him to sell milk in that particular market 
has one vote.  Virginia has similar provisions in its law as to when its com­
mission's orders are effective (as do many other states) but specifies certain 
persons or groups that can institute hearings. A hearing is required to pre­
cede any exercise of power in any market and also the withdrawal of the 
Commission once regulations have been in effect.  Hearings may be called 
by the milk commission, a producers' association, or producers if no associa­
tion exists, and by distributors if those requesting a hearing distribute the 
major part of the milk consumed in the market.  The commission must 
withdraw upon the majority petition of producers and distributors as to 
volume and acting jointly. 
The right of state control agencies to establish rules and regulations 
within a marketing area in order to effectuate the purpose of the act has been 
challenged in a number of courts on the ground that an undue delegation of 
legislative powers, which do not legally belong to them, has been conferred 
upon the agencies, but in almost every case the courts have upheld the con­
trol laws. 
A recent case (February 7, 1940) decided in the State Supreme Court 
of Louisiana declared unconstitutional the section in the Louisiana law that 
empowered the commission to make all necessary rules and regulations for 
carrying out the provisions of the act and to attach penalties for failure to 
heed the rules and regulations promulgated. 
Investigational powers.  All the state control agencies (or their rep­
resentatives in some states) have the power to investigate all matters pertain­
ing to production, distribution, manufacture, storage, and sale of milk within 
their state.  Rhode Island and New Jersey also add importation as a process 
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manufacturing, appears to be somewhat questionable with respect to those 
states that limit the product to be controlled to milk and cream. The power 
of investigation and regulation in most states is supported by the power to 
(1) subpoena books, persons, records, etc., relative to the milk industry ; 
(2) enter into places where milk is received, handled, bottled, etc. (nine states 
limit the entry to these places with the provision, "at all reasonable hours") ; 
(3) administer oaths ;  (4) inspect books, accounts, papers, records, etc. ; and 
(5) hold public hearings. 
More than half of the states require that all information obtained by 
the agency or its duly authorized representatives shall be kept confidential 
except as may be necessary in court or market hearings.  Alabama, Florida, 
and Montana even go so far as to make the unwarranted divulgence of con­
fidential material by a member of the agency or its representative an offense 
subject to fine and/or imprisonment. The Oregon law makes provision for 
the Milk Control Board to conduct investigations concurrently with the Ore­
gon State College.  Virginia provides for assistance to the commission from 
the Virginia Agricultural Experiment Station and Extension Service. 
The majority of states require persons to answer subpoenas. The fail­
ure to do so may result in a fine, jail sentence, or attachment proceedings as 
the law may specify.  In connection with the power to administer oaths and 
subpoena persons, the Oregon, Virginia, and Florida laws give the agency 
the power to take deposition of witnesses within or without the state. 
The marketing orders for establishing marketing areas within the several 
states specify the type of information required by the control agency from 
the records and reports of the licensees.  In a few of the states other members 
of the milk industry as well as licensees are required to submit such records 
and reports as the agency may desire.  The failure to keep and submit such 
required reports and records has resulted in a great number of court cases, 
but in almost every case the control agency has forced the violator to perform 
such duties. 
Licensing powers.  Licensing powers have been granted to control 
agencies for financing the cost of administration and to give to the control 
agency a method of enforcing the regulations and orders promulgated for the 
various markets.  The enforcement procedure is to deny, suspend, or even 
revoke licenses for violation of the rules of the control agency. 
Before proceeding to list the various violations that are sufficient grounds 
for denial, suspension, or revocation of a license as set forth by the several 
state laws, it might be well to analyze the definitions of "milk dealer or dis­
tributor" used by these states.  In each state the milk dealer or distributor 
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among the 19 states having milk control laws.  The majority has a simple 
definition of a milk dealer, varying perhaps only in wording. This definition 
limits the milk dealer to any person or firm that purchases or handles milk 
for sale in fluid milk channels within the state.  Connecticut, Florida, Maine, 
Montana, Oregon, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Wisconsin follow this defi­
nition closely.  Wisconsin adds the phrase "buying for resale either per­
sonally or through an agent or as an agent of another."  Montana and Vir­
ginia include resale ; whether the milk is sold on or off the premises the per­
son is still a dealer.  Connecticut, however, makes an exemption of those sell­
ing milk for consumption off the premises.  Virginia adds producer-dis­
tributors and stores as dealers.  Several of the states specify that any pro­
ducer who sells milk to a milk dealer only shall not be deemed to be a milk 
dealer. 
The New York and California definitions of a milk dealer are broad. 
They include brokers, agents, and cooperative associations, whether incor­
porated or not, who handle fluid milk for sale.  California includes as dealers 
or distributors producers or associations of producers and stores if they 
engage in processing or bottling fluid milk or if they sell milk for consump­
tion on the premises.  New York exempts dealers within the smaller com­
munities at its discretion and eliminates stores that do not deliver milk to 
consumers by vehicle. 
Vermont and New Hampshire have their concept of a milk dealer pat­
terned almost alike.  The definition reads, "Any person who produces and 
sells or who purchases for sale or sells milk daily within the state for con­
sumption, disposition or use within the state, except consumption on the 
premises." A producer who delivers or sells milk to a distributor is not 
deemed a distributor.  New Hampshire limits the definition to any person 
delivering more than 2 quarts per day.  From the wording of the definition 
it can be assumed that the law specifies that daily deliveries be made or the 
distributors shall be subject to penalty. 
A somewhat different definition is in effect in the states of Pennsylvania, 
New Jersey, and Massachusetts. The definition reads somewhat as follows : 
"Any person who purchases or handles milk within the state for sale, ship­
ment, storage, processing, or manufacturing within or without the state." 
Massachusetts replaces some of the foregoing words with "bottler," "pro­
cessor," and "pasteurizer."  Pennsylvania includes stores, and New Jersey 
adds distributing brokers and persons who produce for sale directly to con­
sumers, except for consumption on the premises.  Under its  licensing 
powers, Rhode Island specifies that no foreign corporation shall be granted 
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Mandatory licensing is required in every state for all members of the 
milk industry that fall within the definition of a milk dealer.  The Alabama 
licensing provisions are mandatory only in the marketing areas where the 
provisions of the law have been applied. New Hampshire and Vermont limit 
mandatory licensing to the areas in which the control agency is operating. 
Oregon gives the Board discretion to license dealers in population centers of 
15,000 or under.  Pennsylvania may exclude dealers from the licensing pro­
visions if the said dealer handles less than 1,500 pounds of milk per month, 
and Wisconsin has a somewhat similar provision applying only to producer-
distributors that distribute less than 10 quarts daily.  As has been mentioned 
before, the New York law gives the Commissioner of Agriculture and Mar­
kets discretionary power in licensing distributors in the small communities. 
Alabama grants wide powers to its Board for controlling the extension of a 
milk business, i.e., a distributor's business.  Approval is necessary by the 
Board and depends on the quantity of milk in the market, effect on public 
interest, and the capability of the dealer financially and otherwise.  Besides 
its other licensing powers, Pennsylvania also gives its commission the right 
to issue permits for weighing or measuring to each milk dealer.  This permit 
costs $5 annually.  Butterfat testers must also be certified by the commission 
and are required to pay an annual $3 fee. 
Denial, suspension, and revocation of licenses.  The action of the 
control agencies and the ground for denying, suspending, or revoking the 
license of a licensee is well defined in most states.  Upon application to the 
agency for a license, the applicant in the following states must convince the 
agency that he has adequate personnel and facilities as well as financial re­
sources properly to conduct his business :  Alabama, Florida, Indiana, New 
York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.  Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
Oregon, and Pennsylvania also require that the applicant must state that he 
has complied fully with all the rules and regulations of the control agency. 
Practically every state before suspending, denying, or revoking a license 
gives the person concerned notice and a hearing before taking action. A few 
of the states permit the respondent to show cause why his license should not 
be withheld. A provision in the Massachusetts law states that where the 
license of an applicant has been refused or revoked "for cause within the next 
preceding year" the opportunity for hearing, but not due notice, may be dis­
pensed with in the case of an applicant or licensee. A statement in the New 
Hampshire law that is of doubtful validity provides that the board does not 
have to hold a hearing upon refusing a license.  Virginia provides for notice 
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Each state law directly or indirectly grants to its board or commission 
authority to revoke licenses as a penalty for violation of orders or regulations. 
Considerable court action has resulted in those states in which the control 
agency has resorted to revocation of the licenses.  It is claimed by many mem­
bers of the industry that the revocation of a license is a severe penalty for 
infraction of rules that in some cases are not just and reasonable.  It is 
suggested that the imposition of larger fines would accomplish the same 
purpose without exiling the licensee, except in some extremely intolerable 
cases. 
Bonding.  The bonding of milk dealers (as defined previously) or 
licensees is required in approximately 65 per cent of the states having milk 
control laws.  Seven states do not require or have not mentioned bonding 
requirements in their laws.  Virginia makes no mention of bonding within 
the law but in two of the markets that it has established in the state bonding is 
provided.  Three states, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New Jersey, 
have bonding requirements for dealers under a separate act, not within the 
milk control act itself.  New Jersey requires bonds of dealers, subdealers, 
or processors ; New Hampshire requires bond or dealer must make satis­
factory showing as to real estate ownership within the state.  Those states 
requiring bonding stipulate the amount of the bond usually relating to the 
volume handled.  The amount varies from $1,000 in California to not more 
than $100,000 in Pennsylvania.  Other states may have smaller or larger 
amounts than the foregoing citations.  New York makes provisions for ex­
emptions, if the dealer can satisfy the Commissioner of Agriculture and 
Markets as to his financial position.  Indiana has somewhat similar require­
ments ; the dealer must file a bond or show by a financial statement that a 
60-day supply of milk can be paid for.  Alabama and Connecticut have 
similar prerequisites for bonding.  Alabama states that should a dealer fail 
to pay for milk without just cause within a reasonable period the board may 
require a bond in sum twice the amount of purchases for the past 15 days. 
Connecticut requires that the dealer must pay for milk obtained within 
2 months or obtain bond double the value of the amount of milk purchased 
the preceding month.  Georgia stipulates bonds from $2,000 to $10,000 but 
will accept cash deposited with a bank or trust company in lieu of bond. 
Pennsylvania requires that an applicant for a license file a personal bond ; if 
this bond is not adequate, he can be required to file a surety or collateral bond 
of not more than $100,000. A cooperative does not have to file a bond. Sub-
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Louisiana made no provisions for bonding in its original act, but on the 
application of the law the milk commission tried to force milk dealers to put 
up bonds.  The undelegated bonding requirements of the Louisiana milk 
commission were declared void in the State Supreme Court case of February 
7, 1940. A separate bonding act was enacted on July 2, 1940. 
Unfair trade practices.  Six of the nineteen states make no provisions 
in their acts as to what practices can be considered unfair competition or un­
fair trade practices.  Alabama lists  (1) false and misleading advertising, 
(2) misrepresentation of product, and (3) sales promotion schemes.  To 
these California adds (1) payments, allowances or acceptances  of secret 
rebates, or refunds, etc.; (2) giving of milk or cream, except to  bona fide 
charities ;  (3) extension of special prices or services to certain customers 
and not to all; and (4) purchase of fluid milk in excess of 100  gallons 
monthly from producers or associations of producers unless a written con­
tract has been entered into, which contract must contain  certain provisions 
and be filed with the Director of Agriculture and Markets. A large number 
of states although not specifically listing the foregoing practices as  being 
unfair, do consider them unlawful and subject to legal penalty.  Secret re­
bates, discounts, refunds, and special services are strongly denounced.  Other 
states list such destructive acts as being just cause for revocation of licenses. 
Vermont has an interesting provision, specifying that anyone intimidating a 
producer, causing him to withdraw from a producers' association, is guilty 
of unfair discrimination.  The majority of states, under the powers given 
them in the act, whether unfair trade practices are prescribed within  their 
laws or not, have set forth certain definite practices that they  consider 
demoralizing and unfair for the milk market areas within which they operate, 
and that all members of the milk industry are to avoid.  Wisconsin has a 
unique provision against unfair trade practices in giving the Director of 
Agriculture power to enjoin a person from employing practices that are detri­
mental and tend to cause needless waste and duplication.  This power, if 
more widely interpreted, could be used to maintain the status quo of the milk 
industry in Wisconsin. 
Materials have been obtained from Alabama, Virginia, and Wisconsin 
that provide good illustrations of trade practice regulations instituted by 
these control agencies. The Alabama and Wisconsin rules of fair trade prac­
tices are for any market in which milk control is in effect, whereas the Vir­
ginia trade practice regulations are for the Norfolk-Portsmouth market in 
which the milk commission is operating.  The following rules of fair trade 
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licensee is required to use store bottles in the wholesale trade; (2) deposit of 
3 cents per bottle is required from wholesale purchasers (the 3 cents must be 
imprinted on the container) ;  (3) each licensee shall make a duplicate sales 
slip for each wholesale transaction; (4) any distributor  may submit bids 
asked for by a governing agency.  Distributors are prohibited from any of 
the following practices :  (1) paying for advertising directly or indirectly; 
(2) joining with a milk customer in a radio program ;  (3) providing a milk 
customer with various free services and articles ; (4) entering into a contract 
to give premiums or prizes ;  (5) using other dealers' milk containers. A 
producer-distributor may, however, advertise his product by giving a free 
sample of one bottle of milk to a prospective customer for  one time only 
within a period of 6 months. 
A few of the Alabama rules of fair trade practices  are as follows : 
(1) prevent buying, selling, or trafficking in other dealers' milk containers ; 
(2) no licensee to give prizes or free gifts and services  ;  (3) no licensee to 
become a party with the intent of making certain provisions of the law 
inoperative; (4) no licensee to give more than one quart sample of any 
bottled milk products in any month; and (5)  no wholesale producer to 
transfer or obtain milk from other producers to supplement  or maintain his 
quota. 
The Wisconsin standards, which differ somewhat from the foregoing 
fair trade practices, follow: (1) it is unfair to use a salesman or driver who 
has been employed within one year previously by another dealer ;  (2) it is
unfair for a person to solicit for milk on the route he covered within the year 
for another dealer ; and (3) no distributor shall sell milk to a peddler, unless 
the peddler owns a plant holding a board of health permit for processing and 
distributing milk, except that licenses granted to peddlers prior to February
7, 1934, are exempt. 
Florida is the only state that gives its milk control  agency direct power 
to control the using, dispensing, or trafficking of milk bottles, cans, or other 
containers belonging to another firm.  Alabama, Virginia, and Wisconsin 
consider such action an unfair trade practice subject to penalty if violated. 
Wisconsin and Virginia especially give detailed prescriptions for  markings
and use of milk containers. 
The right of a control agency to establish rules and regulations gives it 
considerable power not specifically granted within the law itself.  Many of 
the rules and regulations issued by milk control agencies in the several states 
have been contested by milk dealers  as an undue delegation of legislative 
authority.  Only in Louisiana has the commission been deprived of its right
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Mediation and arbitration.  Arbitration and mediation of disputes or 
controversies arising between or among distributors, producers, and con­
sumers is a power granted the control agencies in thirteen states.  Six state 
laws make no mention of such power. Although New Hampshire and Ver­
mont do not specifically mention arbitration and mediation they do state, "the 
Board shall secure the cooperation of those engaged in the industry to main­
tain fair and lawful trade practices." 
The decisions of the Alabama control agency in mediating or arbitrating 
such controversies are conclusive and binding on the parties involved.  Con­
necticut makes a somewhat similar statement except the findings are binding 
and final only by agreement of the parties in advance of the hearing. Rhode 
Island does not grant the power specifically, but the law prescribes that the 
Board shall endeavor to effect amicable reconciliation of differences between 
milk interests. 
Limitations and exceptions.  Each state usually places certain limi­
tations or exceptions on the powers of the control agency or the application 
of the provisions of the act in the various markets. One limitation in all the 
laws is that the provisions of the respective act shall in no way conflict or 
abrogate, but may supplement existing health or sanitary laws of any mu­
nicipality, state, or county, and the milk dealer licenses shall be required in 
addition to any other licenses that may be required. The State of New York 
goes further by stating that no health officer of any county, city, or village 
shall approve an additional milk supply without first satisfying the commis­
sioner that the added supply is necessary for the city and will not deprive 
another city of its supply. A somewhat similar restriction by a New Jersey 
city was declared void in the case of Sheffield Farms vs. Seaman  (1935) 
(114 N.J.L. 455). 
Approximately half of the states prescribe exceptions for producers 
who milk or distribute milk from a certain number of cows.  The Oregon 
law states that any producer with more than one cow, who distributes his 
milk, must be licensed and pay any poundage assessment.  Georgia permits 
an exemption of producers from provisions of the act as long as they milk 
fewer than six cows.  Another common limitation or exception provided by 
most state laws is that nothing in the acts shall prohibit a cooperative from 
blending proceeds to its members and making deductions if authorized by its 
members. The  1935 California law read that "no marketing and stabilization 
plan may involve a limitation upon the production of fluid milk or cream, or 
the development of monopolies in either production or distribution."  It ap­
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recent amendments have reversed this provision to read that "nothing in this 
chapter (735.1) shall be construed as permitting or authorizing the develop­
ment of conditions of monopoly in the production or distribution of fluid 
milk or fluid cream."  This amendment might provide a limitation to the 
development of cooperatives. 
Three of the state laws specifically permit the donation of milk to chari­
ties.  Milk sold out of the state is not usually included in the determination of 
license fees. New Jersey and Alabama provide that should any municipality 
suspend or revoke a license of a dealer the board shall automatically suspend 
the dealer's license until the dealer is reinstated by the municipality.  There 
are many other limitations and exceptions adopted by the several states. 
PROVISIONS AS TO PRICE REGULATIONS 
Fixing producer prices, resale prices, and methods by which producers 
are to be paid are perhaps the most complicated provisions within the laws 
or within the orders issued by the control agencies.  Quota and pooling plans 
have been avoided by the majority of the states that have had their laws on 
an indefinite basis.  Those states that started out with permanent laws or 
have enacted permanent legislation since the passage of the original law have 
made definite progress toward incorporating some type of pooling mechanism 
and some scientific system for paying producers.  Such provisions appear 
necessary to provide an equitable means of distributing returns to producers 
in a market and for controlling surplus milk, especially in the large markets. 
Those states that have done the pioneering in the use of various pricing 
mechanisms have revised their orders a great deal as a result of changing 
conditions.  The producer-distributor has been the member in the milk in­
dustry who has been the chief source of worry to the agencies trying to set 
up equitable price structures and payment mechanisms. 
Requirements as to price fixing.  All but five states' laws prescribe 
standards that the control agency shall follow in establishing prices.  The 
Rhode Island law provides that in determining such prices the control agency 
should apply reasonable regulation.  Wisconsin did prescribe standards in 
its early law that the Director of Agriculture and Markets was to have used 
as a basis for establishing price schedules, but the recent law withholds these 
standards that allowed the Director to prescribe "terms and conditions" as 
may be necessary.  Louisiana is the only state that does not make some defi­
nite reference to prices paid to producers or to be charged consumers, 
although the law does make vague reference to the price of milk under the 
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some type of standards by which the control agency is to set equitable pro­
ducer and resale prices.  The standards set up by the several states consist 
of the following that are to be considered :  cost of production and distribu­
tion, fair return to producer and dealer, reasonable costs for hauling and 
processing, balance between production and consumption, purchasing power 
of the public, and relation of milk prices to prices of other foods.  In almost 
every state the agency was to consider such prices as would adequately 
protect the milk industry and insure a sufficient supply of pure and whole­
some milk.  Florida, Montana, and Pennsylvania make special mention of 
the welfare of children.  In fixing prices to producers, the control agencies 
use the standards that are set up for them within the law. 
Only one state, California, specifically mentions that the price of fluid 
milk and cream paid to producers shall be based on the price of manufactur­
ing milk and cream.  The California system provides that the cost of 
producing fluid milk and the cost of producing manufacturing milk be deter­
mined, the difference to be added to the price of manufacturing milk to 
arrive at the fluid milk price.  (20)  Using this as a base, a formula 
for an automatic price change has been devised, which has been upheld in 
the California State Supreme Court in the case of Ray et al vs. Parker, 
Director of Agriculture (99 Cal. Dec. 240 ;  15  (2) 275).  Whenever 
economic conditions change sufficiently to cause changes in the price-deter­
mining factors, the formula automatically registers a change in producer 
prices for Class I fluid milk.  Although California is the only state directly 
providing such pricing provisions, a great number of the state control agencies 
without doubt consider the price of manufacturing milk in computing pro­
ducer prices.  Many of the states did not consider the relation between fluid 
milk prices and manufacturing milk prices at the beginning, and they found 
that when these prices were out of proportion milk would flow toward the 
market offering the better price. 
New York will establish producer prices at the request of 35 per cent of 
all producers and the acceptance of 75 per cent of all producers. The Director 
of Agriculture and Markets may rescind such price provisions at his own 
motion or at the request of 35 per cent of all producers. The Florida, New 
Hampshire, and Vermont agencies may fix prices on complaint from producers 
or on their own initiative.  Maine is required to change prices at the request 
of producers. The Indiana board may fix prices on its own initiative or by 
approval of schedules filed by distributors or approval of prices arrived at by 
two or more distributors and one or more cooperatives or by the approval of 
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Three states require the milk control agencies to set minimum wholesale 
and retail prices when producer prices are established.  Fifteen states grant 
control agencies permissive powers to establish minimum resale prices, while 
five of these extend this authority to the fixing of maximum resale prices. 
Massachusetts, Oregon, and Pennsylvania make provisions for fixing the 
boundary of the milksheds in which price provisions are to be effective and 
from which milk is to be obtained to supply a particular market. 
New York may fix handling charges as well as prices and require that 
producers whose milk is bought and shipped to another state that regulates 
prices are to receive those prices of said state less transportation costs.  This 
particular provision might have doubtful validity, especially since the milk 
enters into interstate commerce.  The board in Massachusetts may also fix 
interdealer prices.  The Pennsylvania commission has discretionary powers 
as to fixing prices on milk used for manufacturing purposes.  Wisconsin has 
a somewhat different requirement in that the Department of Agriculture in 
fixing price schedules is to consider terms of any collective bargaining arrived 
at between producers and dealers.  Georgia and Montana have a unique pro­
vision that requires that the producer prices established by the control agency 
shall be not less than one-half the price the consumer has to pay. 
Pricing.  Four different methods for paying producers for their milk 
are the flat price plan, class-use plan, basic-surplus plan, and the combination 
price plan.  The flat price plan calls for one price for all milk delivered by 
the producer.  The class-use plan develops classes of milk as to its usage. 
The basic-surplus plan calls for two or more prices, and the proceeds from 
the sale of milk are distributed to the producers according to the market value 
contributed by each producer.  The combination price plan combines the 
class-use principle, in that milk is sold to the dealer for its market value in its 
different uses, and the basic-surplus idea, in that proceeds are returned to 
each producer on the basis of his contribution to the market value. 
A great number of the state laws are not specific as to the plan that 
should be used for paying the individual producer. A majority of the states 
provide for a class-use system of pricing market milk.  The number of 
classes varies from two in some states to as high as nine in New York. A 
large number of these states using the class-use system also provide for base 
rating, which means that they are using the combination pricing plan. Oregon 
uses the basic-surplus price plan without the class-use system ; one price is 
paid for base milk and a calculated price for surplus.  The Vermont board 
may fix prices for milk on different grades, not specifically according to the 
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milk, provides additional classifications in some of its orders.  These are : 
(1) unaccounted milk; (2) distressed milk ; (3) milk resold in other states ; 
and (4) milk sold by dealer to dealer. 
Inasmuch as the control agencies in most states have discretionary 
powers as to the type of price plan to employ, this permits the use of the 
price plan best adapted to a particular market. As a result, the pricing plans 
used within a given state may not be uniform. On the other hand, coordina­
tion of different price plans within the markets of the state might be difficult, 
and the control agency might find  itself "swamped" with enforcement 
problems. 
Although every law does not specifically mention whether the price pro­
visions as established apply to the state as a whole or merely to a particular 
market area, it can be assumed that the pricing plans are in every state lim­
ited to a particular area.  Prior to the 1939 amendment Oregon had a state­
wide pricing plan in effect with one set price for every market regardless of 
location.  As it was found after a few years of experience that cost condi­
tions varied considerably over the state, the above-mentioned amendment was 
attached to the law limiting the price-fixing powers of the board to a particu­
lar market, and requiring a separate order for each market. 
The majority of states, regardless of price plan used, also have pro­
visions for different prices for milk based on the grade of milk sent to the 
market.  The grades of milk are established solely on the sanitary require­
ments established by the states, cities, or counties that may apply to a market­
ing area.  One grade or more may be used within a particular use-class of 
milk as established in a price plan or without the other plans.  In some states 
a premium price is paid for Grade A raw milk.  Other states also consider 
transportation charges and butterfat differentials in determining prices to 
producers.  When all these factors are considered, the pricing mechanism 
becomes too complicated for the average dairy farmer to compute, thus neces­
sitating a staff of accountants and statisticians to aid the control agency in 
determining prices. 
Rhode Island allows the producers, subject to certain restrictions, to 
determine the prices that dealers must pay them.  This schedule of prices is 
then supplied the dealers and when published in the newspapers of the state 
constitutes an official order, and the dealers must pay the prices as scheduled 
or be subject to penalty for violation of an order. 
Those states using the combination price plan or base-surplus plan, as 
described above, make provisions for the establishing of producers' quotas. 
Virginia speaks of those quotas as "basic allotments," New Jersey refers to 
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rating system." The quota or base is an amount assigned to each producer as 
his share of a particular market as determined by previous performance, with 
the low producing months of a selected year or years as the base period. The 
producer is expected to continue producing enough milk to fulfill his base 
requirement and as a result receives a higher price for milk produced within 
the base or quota and a lower price for all milk delivered in excess of his 
base or quota.  The quota system is used as a means of encouraging pro­
ducers to maintain a somewhat constant production of milk throughout the 
year and to reduce surplus production, which is the cause or can be the cause 
of a great many problems in a milk market.  The quota system is severely 
denounced by many producers who distribute their own milk, and the plan 
has been vigorously contested in the courts.  The basic-surplus plan works 
more efficiently if a market-wide pooling system is used. 
A good illustration of how these various pricing systems operate can be 
found in the marketing orders issued in Oregon, New York, Virginia, and 
Wisconsin.  Virginia and Wisconsin make use of the combination pricing 
system ; New York has adopted the class-use system ; and Oregon uses the 
basic-surplus plan entirely. 
The Oregon law through its quota system probably provides the most 
rigid supervision of the producer of any of the states with milk control laws. 
The control board also prevents producers and distributors from transferring 
from one market to another without the board's approval. 
Methods of paying producers. The methods to be used by distribu­
tors to pay producers are not mentioned in the laws of Florida, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Maine, Montana, and Vermont.  If pooling is being used, it has 
been set up at the discretion of the control agency. The remaining state laws 
permit the control agencies to require the individual-dealer type pool or the 
market-wide pool.  The New Hampshire law provides that the flat-price plan 
may be used to pay producers.  This plan is seldom used, especially in the 
large markets and where alternative opportunities for the disposal of milk by 
the producer are many. 
The individual-dealer type pool is an equalization plan that is handled by 
the individual dealer for the benefit of his own producers. Under this plan 
the producers receive a prorated share of the total price of the milk delivered. 
Under the individual-dealer type pool the producers for a given firm may 
receive more or less per unit than is paid to other producers in the market. 
The discrepancy arises because one dealer may be able to sell more of his 
milk as Class I or Class II milk that usually bring the higher prices. Where 
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obligated to check the dealer's records, books, and reports to satisfy itself that 
the dealer pays his producers equitably. 
The market-wide pool operates under the principles explained under the 
individual-dealer pool, except that the control agency, a local control board, 
or a representative of the agency manages the equalization pool. The pool is 
somewhat of a clearing-house for all distributors within the particular mar­
ket.  This pooling arrangement provides a method of making uniform the 
producers' price per unit, regardless of the dealer served. The market-wide 
pool provides for the pooling of products of like quality received from all 
producers in the market.  After the expenses of the pool are deducted, the 
net proceeds are prorated to the producers on the basis of their contribution 
to the pool.  The principles involved in the operation of the market-wide pool 
are the same in all markets, but the mechanics of paying the producers may 
vary. 
This market-wide pooling system is more complicated than other systems, 
but it helps to iron out many difficulties that arise among and between pro­
ducers and distributors.  The greatest difficulty with this type of equalization 
arrangement is that the producer-distributors may fail to report the correct 
amount of their sales.  This difficulty becomes even more apparent under 
the basic-surplus plan used in Oregon under which one price is paid for 
butterfat used in milk and cream for fluid consumption and a lower price 
for surplus butterfat.  Naturally, producer-distributors try to maintain their 
yearly production to equal their bottle and can trade, which pays the highest 
price, and to avoid the production of surplus.  As the surplus price reduces 
the equalized payments to all producers, the producer-distributor with chiefly 
a bottle and can trade may report a smaller amount of milk sold in fluid con­
sumption channels than was actually sold or he may claim larger surplus sales. 
Either practise results in decreased payments into the pool, thereby giving 
the producer-distributor a price advantage as a producer over all other pro­
ducers in the market.  It is not the intention of the authors to infer that there 
is intentionally a general violation of the law within the ranks of the producer-
distributors.  The condition ref erred to arises primarily from the unwilling­
ness or inability of producer-distributors to maintain adequate records. 
The Oregon system of market-wide pooling with a basic-surplus price 
plan in quota markets is worthy of review.  According to a report, Milk 
Control Laws, issued by the United States Department of Agriculture, 
"The board's orders operate to yield each qualified producer the basic pool
price for all milk sold by him up to the amount of his quota and regardless of
whether such milk is actually sold as fluid milk at the minimum price or in 
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ceeds of all milk sold in excess of his quota shall be credited into the surplus
pool (regardless of the price at which it may be sold) ; and that after deducting
the board's expense the average price received for surplus milk shall be dis­
tributed to producers in accordance with the quantity of their respective surplus
sales.  Incident to market-wide pooling under the board's orders is the fact that
a producer may not receive the full minimum price for his entire quota, even
though he may have sold it all as fluid milk for the minimum price, because of
the inability of other producers to sell the entire amount of their quotas for hu­
man consumption. The basic price is thus reduced and in the equalization process
those who have received the full minimum price must of necessity remit a portion
of their receipts in order that the returns may be uniform to all." 
Oregon producer-distributors were exempt from pooling and rating pro­
visions in the Act of 1933. A court decision (Meyer et al vs. Oregon Milk 
Control Board and Brandes Creamery) declared the exemption to be unlawful 
discrimination and invalid.  In the Portland market, when the surplus within 
the basic pool exceeds by 5 per cent or more all delivered quotas on the mar­
ket, this group is required to make equalization payments up to 5 per cent of 
such surplus and no more.  In the Eugene market the producer-distributor's 
quota is his sales of fluid milk and cream produced by him in the bottle and 
can trade. He must carry a 5 per cent surplus for the market and is subject 
to payment of equalization thereon.  Surplus over that is carried by other 
producers.  Producer-distributors have continually opposed paying any 
equalization. 
In 1933 a state-wide pooling arrangement was undertaken in Connecticut 
but was declared unconstitutional. 
The recent California amendment allows the Director of Agriculture and 
Markets to provide equalization provisions for all milk sold to distributors 
for pasteurization purposes, if approved by 65 per cent of all producers by 
volume and number. The New York law gives the Commissioner of Agri­
culture and Markets power to establish equalization for producers if  re­
quested by 75 per cent of the producers in the market. 
As has been mentioned under producer prices, almost every state makes 
provision that nothing in the law shall prevent an association of producers 
from blending or equalizing the proceeds of its members. 
Resale prices.  Whether or not state control agencies should set resale 
prices is one of the most controversial issues regarding milk control laws at 
present.  Resale price provisions have been incorporated in the majority of 
the laws at the insistence of the distributing group.  This group felt that if 
the control agencies were going to guarantee a minimum price to the producer 
then the distributing group should be protected likewise by a guarantee of a 
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have been able to maintain their spread rather consistently through good or 
bad years. 
Connecticut and New York, following the lead of the Federal Govern­
ment, have abandoned the fixing of minimum resale prices.  The Louisiana 
law makes no mention of resale prices.  Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Penn­
sylvania, Vermont, and Virginia give their control agency the power to set 
minimum and/or maximum retail and wholesale prices.  California, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, and Rhode 
Island give their control agency power to fix only minimum retail and whole­
sale prices.  Massachusetts may fix these minimum retail or wholesale prices 
only on petition from 25 per cent of the producers in the market. They are 
set on the assumption that producers' prices cannot otherwise be maintained. 
In California, Oregon, and Pennsylvania the fixing of minimum resale prices 
is mandatory whenever producer prices are established.  In other states the 
control agencies seem to have the power to fix minimum resale prices at their 
discretion. 
Wisconsin allows its Department of Agriculture to fix a schedule of 
resale prices.  The Indiana Board may fix minimum resale prices if it finds 
that an emergency exists in a market and the enforcement of the act is hin­
dered, and after the proper request by 30 per cent of the number of dealers 
handling 70 per cent of the milk or vice versa. The only restrictions are that 
such prices must be just and reasonable.  Approximately one-half of the 
states besides mandating or giving the control agency the power to fix resale 
prices also state to whom these resale prices shall apply. A typical example 
follows :  milk dealer to store, store to consumer (consumption on or off the 
premises), milk dealers to milk dealers, milk dealers to consumers, and one 
person to another for commercial purposes. 
Several of the states list the grades and classes of milk for which resale 
prices are to be fixed.  An example is the resale schedule adopted by New 
Jersey including Grade A ;  fluid milk other than Grade A ; heavy, medium, 
light, and sour cream ; and buttermilk.  Vermont specifies that resale prices 
apply to sweet table cream, whole milk, medium cream, light or coffee cream, 
and certified milk, which takes a higher price than whole milk. An example 
of an Oregon order indicates that minimum prices are set for 1 pints, pints, 
quarts, and gallon lots in cans, at wholesale and retail for 4 and 5 per cent 
milk.  Light cream (18-22 per cent butterfat) and heavy cream (30-33 per 
cent butterfat) are also priced under the same size category.  Bulgarian but­
termilk "with butterfat" is priced the same as 5 per cent milk, and chocolate 
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The California law requires careful investigation before minimum retail 
or wholesale prices are to be established.  The following economic factors 
are to be considered :  (1) quantities of fluid milk and cream delivered, 
(2) cost of cream and milk to distributors and retail stores, (3) quantities 
normally required, (4) reasonable cost of handling fluid milk  or cream, 
(5) purchasing power of the public.  In establishing these prices the Di­
rector of Agriculture must determine that such prices are not more than 
reasonably sufficient to cover all necessary costs, according to the method or 
type of distribution, including a reasonable return upon necessary capital 
invested.  These prices shall be sufficient to maintain in the business of dis­
tributing fluid milk and fluid cream, or both, such number of reasonably 
efficient retail stores and distributors of fluid milk and cream as are necessary 
to supply consumers with the required supply.  Also these prices are to pro­
tect the interest of consumers of fluid milk, fluid cream, or both, in such mar­
keting areas by insuring to them adequate and efficient distribution facilities. 
Some miscellaneous requirements or limitations follow :  Wisconsin may 
require labeling of containers to reflect the different resale price brackets; 
Florida states that the purchase of milk by a store contrary to the price de­
termined by the board shall not be deemed a violation of the law by the pur­
chaser; and Georgia requires that the board shall give the licensee 10 days 
prior notice before changing prices. 
None of the state laws makes mandatory a cash and carry differential. 
Several of the control agencies have made provisions in their price orders 
for lower prices to customers who call for their milk at the stores.  Quantity 
discounts are used considerably.  Most orders provide for lower prices on 
milk used by school children or that used in relief. 
ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS 
Almost every state milk control law describes as being unlawful certain 
acts that if pursued would be considered violations of the milk control law. 
Violations of the rules and regulations of the several milk control agencies 
have been numerous.  Offenders in many instances have been prosecuted, 
and these court cases have served to build precedent for subsequent decisions. 
The courts of the State of New York have prosecuted  more milk control 
cases than any other state courts.  The milk control division of the Depart­
ment of Agriculture and Markets of that state has been quite active in press­
ing its orders against violators and into the courts should its orders be chal­
lenged, as has been done in a large number of cases.  These court decisions 
have aided other states in designing their legislation and procedure so that it 45  ECONOMIC CONTROL OF THE MARKET MILK INDUSTRY 
would be more effective and less likely to be challenged by the members of the 
milk industry. 
Unlawful acts. A great number of actions are deemed unlawful, but 
the majority of the states list specific actions, dealing principally with buying 
and selling of milk, as being unlawful. These can be summarized as follows : 
(1) buying and selling of milk unless licensed, (2) buying and selling at 
prices below those set by the control agency, and (3) indulging in unfair 
trade practices in the disposition of milk.  Connecticut, Georgia, and Mon­
tana make it specific that it is a violation for licensees to fail to obtain a 
license at the specified time.  Connecticut, Montana, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, Oregon, Virginia, and Wisconsin provide penalties for persons fail­
ing to answer a subpoena.  Florida, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, 
and Rhode Island consider as unlawful acts and subject to penalty the pur­
chase of out-of-state milk at lower prices than those paid in the state and 
the purchase of milk within the state for out-of-state shipment at lower 
prices than provided by the act.  New Hampshire and Vermont make no 
statements as to what are considered unlawful acts but penalties are provided 
for several offenses.  New Jersey limits unlawful acts only to milk dealers. 
Florida and Montana add that any member of the control agency divulging 
confidential material has committed an unlawful act and may be prosecuted. 
Florida also forbids sale and trafficking of milk in milk containers owned by 
other dealers or the actual possession of those containers by another.  Mas­
sachusetts has recently added a so-called "locality discrimination" clause, 
which prohibits dealer discrimination of prices to buyers for the same kind 
of product in the same locality.  Rhode Island specifies that one cannot 
refuse to deliver or a dealer to accept milk without 15 days written notice 
unless the failure to deliver or to accept is due to uncontrollable causes. 
Louisiana has a different provision stating that a person refusing to deliver 
to officers or authorized agents of the Louisiana Milk Commission a sample 
of milk or milk products shall be guilty of violating the milk control act. 
Penalties.  The penalties provided by the state laws relative to viola­
tions of the law and the acts deemed unlawful vary from fines of $5 up to 
$5,000, and jail sentences from 10 days up to 1 year.  Besides these penalties 
the control agency reserves the right to refuse, suspend, or revoke a license 
of any licensee, if he does not conduct his business as required.  This power, 
if indiscriminately or unjustly applied, can be severely damaging to the person 
or persons affected.  This power, moreover, delegated as it is in most cases 
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smaller members of the industry who might not have the financial power to 
protect themselves in lengthy court litigation. 
For violating provisions of the act, only six states specify fines alone 
ranging from $50 in New Jersey and Rhode Island to $1,000 in Indiana. The 
$50 fine in New Jersey and Rhode Island applies to the first offense ; for sub­
sequent offenses the fine in New Jersey is $200 and in Rhode Island $500. 
All the states provide fines and jail sentences or both for violation of the act. 
The exact penalties prescribed in New York and Georgia are not known. 
Fines range from $10 in Louisiana to $5,000 in Wisconsin besides possible 
imprisonment. The term of imprisonment varies from 10 days in Louisiana 
to not more than 1 year in the majority of the other states.  All of the states 
provide limits to their fines or jail sentences, i.e., either the minimum  or 
maximum fines and days of imprisonment.  The average fine is limited to 
about $500 while the average jail sentence with the fine or without is about 6 
months.  More than one-half of the states consider each day in which the 
violation occurs a separate offense ; hence a person violating provisions of the 
act in such states as Oregon or Indiana that apply heavy fines will suffer 
heavily should the violation take place over several days.  Connecticut pro­
vides a fine of $100 and/or imprisonment of not more than 3 months but 
prescribes that should additional violations occur the violator shall have his 
license revoked.  Pennsylvania provides fines of not less than $25 and not 
more than $300 for the first two offenses, but should the offender fail to 
pay the fine he is subject to jail sentence of not more than 30 days.  The 
third offense brings a fine of not less than $500 and not more than $1,000 
and/or imprisonment of not more than 1 year. 
Several states provide penalties for making false statements in license 
applications or for violating other provisions of the licensing requirements. 
Indiana provides a $50 fine for a milk dealer making false applications for a 
license, while Florida requires a fine of not less than $300 and not more 
than $1,000 and/or imprisonment of not more than 1 year for making  a 
false statement relative to the tax required of dealers ; 2 per cent is added to 
the tax if the payment is delinquent.  Georgia and Montana add a 10 per cent 
amount to the license fee payment that is delinquent.  Wisconsin stipulates a 
fine of not less than $5 and not more than $100 and/or jail of not  more than 
30 days for violating licensing requirements. 
Those states deeming failure to answer a subpoena  a violation also 
specify penalties for such failure.  Connecticut and New Jersey provide jail 
sentences only.  Montana provides a $600 fine.  New Hampshire, Oregon, 
and Virginia require a fine of not more than $100 and/or jail sentence of not 
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Alabama and Florida also prescribe penalties for those who divulge con­
fidential information.  The fine in Alabama is not less than $100 and not 
more than $1,000, while Florida exacts a fine of not more than $500 and/or 
jail sentence of not more than 1 year. 
A few other miscellaneous penalties are provided such as in New Jersey, 
where the milk that is subject to violation may be seized and sold, with the 
money going to the state.  Wisconsin states that a foreign or domestic cor­
poration that violates certain provisions of the law shall forfeit its rights and 
in the case of a domestic corporation shall forfeit its charter.  In Florida per­
sons trafficking with milk containers other than their own are subject to a 
fine of not more than $500 and/or jail sentence of not more than 60 days. 
Legal remedies accorded the control agency.  In order to secure 
enforcement of the provisions of the act and the various rules and regulations 
promulgated by the control agency, the law in all but three states specifies the 
procedure to be employed by the control agency in administering the law. 
The states making no specific provisions for enforcement are Maine, New 
Hampshire, and Vermont. 
Almost all of the other states give the control agency the choice of taking 
violators before a court of law or equity.  Some states specify the court to 
be used.  In every state that provides some enforcement procedure the con­
trol agency is allowed to obtain an injunction against the violator of an act to 
prevent him from continuous performance of the same act, and in some 
states the right of mandamus is granted.  Most of the states that give their 
control agency the power to enjoin do so with the specific limitation that the 
agency may do so without proving that a legal remedy exists.  Three state 
laws specify that the control agency shall not be required to post a bond if 
involved in a court case. 
The Oregon Milk Control Board may act through the circuit court, to 
which is assigned the duty to compel obedience through attachment proceed­
ings.  Rhode Island specifies only that the control agency apply to the courts 
for enforcement.  Those states deeming the failure to answer a subpoena an 
unlawful act and subject to penalty also specify that the court shall compel 
obedience through attachment proceedings. 
A new and speedier method of dealing with offenders is being introduced 
in many of the states ; namely, using a summons only. The violator is sum­
moned before the control agency or a court and given a cease and desist 
order or given an opportunity to amend his wrongdoings without being 
forced through a costly court procedure.  In the case of revocation or sus­
pension of a license, the licensee has an opportunity to show cause why the 
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Legal remedies accorded the aggrevied parties. The majority of the 
state milk control laws give the aggrieved person or persons the right to file 
a writ of certiorari* after reasonable notice by mail or in person.  After the 
decision of the control agency, the appellant is usually given a certain number 
of days, varying from 10 to 30, in which to file the writ.  Then the control 
agency is given a period of approximately 30 days in which to answer the 
charges made in the writ. Upon review the court may modify or abide by 
the decision of the board or reverse the decision in favor of the appellant.  In 
the case where the control agency seeks enforcement through an injunction 
and the appellant demands a review and a stay of action, the court in some 
states is required to ask the appellant to file a bond to cover any damages that 
might accrue from his continued actions in violation of the injunction should 
he lose the case.  Such action is usually required where price fixing orders 
are being challenged.  New Hampshire and Vermont prescribe that the 
order being contested is in effect as specified by the control agency until the 
case is settled and the agency be ruled against, and that any person seeking 
relief must bear the burden of proof. The Alabama law specifies that a case 
of this nature is given preferred setting and is to be heard as soon as possible. 
It also denies the right of either side to present new evidence. 
The only specific provisions granted in Oregon as legal remedies for 
aggrieved persons concern the refusal, suspension, or revocation of a license. 
They provide that the aggrieved party may obtain a review of the Board's 
order by filing a writ with the circuit court. By not having specific provisions 
for appealing orders other than those concerning licensing, the aggrieved per­
son must appeal to an equity court to enjoin any provisions of the act.  The 
Vermont law prevents the aggrieved party from obtaining an injunction 
against the board.  Virginia limits legal remedies to licensing provisions and 
price fixing orders, and Pennsylvania to licensing provisons.  Florida also 
specifies that the circuit court is the only court that can review suspension, 
revocation, or denial of a license.  Most of the states provide that before the 
appellant takes his case into the higher courts he be given an opportunity for 
rehearing before the control agency and should he be again ruled against, he 
has the right to appeal to the higher courts. 
Montana's law states that action may be brought against the Montana 
Milk Control Board but does not specify the procedure to be followed. 
Louisiana's act makes no mention of legal remedies for aggrieved parties. 
* The writ of certiorari is an order from a superior court to a lower court to obtain
for review its trial records.  It is obtained upon complaint of an aggrieved person that
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Connecticut will not grant an appellant stay of action if he failed to pay for 
milk for 3 months or more without reasonable cause. 
Legal status.  There is hardly a state milk control law that has escaped 
being contested as to its constitutionality either in its own state courts or in 
the higher Federal courts.  Several of the state laws, such as in Washington, 
Michigan, and others have been declared unconstitutional. The New Hamp­
shire law was declared invalid but was soon reinstated.  The Maine law at 
present is being contested.  The rest of the milk control laws have withstood 
several severe attacks as to their constitutionality, and every time a state's 
law is upheld an additional precedent is established that makes the others 
somewhat more secure.  Yet every order or regulation issued by the control 
agency of a state may strike a "hornet's nest" and the law is likely to be 
dragged into court again ;  chances are that it may be declared invalid, 
regardless of precedent.  It all depends on the decision of the judge or jury, 
and opinions are known to have changed. 
Every state has issued a large number of restraining orders or rules and 
regulations controlling members of the milk industry within a particular 
market. New Jersey appears to have done the greatest amount of enforce­
ment work of any milk control agency.  In the first 2 years of its operation 
the milk control board in that state had conducted approximately 1,500 hear­
ings involving dealers, principally those who were operating without licenses, 
cutting prices, failing to make reports, et cetera, collecting approximately 
$13,000 in fines alone.  Massachusetts and Rhode Island have also issued a 
great number of orders against violators. A complete list of all state orders 
and rules and regulations issued against violators is not available, but the 
total number issued by all control agencies is about 5,000. 
The number of cases that have been in the courts of the several states 
and in the Federal court is too great to permit an analysis of all court de­
cisions and rulings, but it is of interest to note some of the more important 
judicial interpretations.  As has been mentioned, precedent was almost en­
tirely lacking prior to 1933 relative to economic regulation of the milk indus­
try through price fixing.  About 1876 the United States Supreme Court, in 
the so-called "granger cases," did hand down some important decisions that 
granted the states power to fix maximum freight rates and railroad fares and 
also permitted public warehouses to make charges for the storage of farm 
products. 
The People vs. Nebbia case as decided by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in 1934 is by far the most outstanding and most cited piece of 
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This case involved the New York State milk control law and was filed against 
a man by the name of Nebbia who chose to sell milk below the prices estab­
lished by the control agency. The Supreme Court upheld the New York law 
in a five to four decision and Mr. Justice Roberts in the majority decision 
stated :  "Price control, like any form of regulation is unconstitutional only 
if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legis­
lature is free to adopt, and hence an unnecessary and unwarranted interfer­
ence with individual liberty."  (24) This decision not only established other 
milk control laws more firmly by giving the enforcement agency more con­
fidence in its actions but has also been used extensively as a precedent for the 
establishment of prices on other commodities besides milk. 
Other important decisions rendered by the courts with respect to the 
validity of the New York law include the Baldwin vs. Seelig case, which was 
also decided by the United States Supreme Court. A unanimous decision 
was rendered by the judges to the effect that a state cannot fix prices on milk 
coming from beyond its borders.  This decision invalidated the provision in 
the New York act that permitted the milk control decision to regulate such 
milk.  In another case arising in New York in 1939, Milk Board vs. Eisen­
berg Co., the United States Supreme Court ruled that a state could prescribe 
minimum prices to be paid by milk dealers to producers even though the 
milk was shipped to another state and sold in that state.  Eisenberg sold in 
New York all the milk that he purchased in Pennsylvania, but only about 10 
per cent of all the milk produced in Pennsylvania was sold in New York. (16) 
Another important New York case was the one involving Borden's vs. 
Ten Eyck in 1936, in which the United States Supreme Court held that the 
one-cent differential that was granted unadvertised brands as against adver­
tised brands was not arbitrary or discriminatory.  According to the court, 
that difference between the amount charged per quart by those distributors 
selling unadvertised milk brought about an economic balance between the 
two types of dealers.  This same provision in the New York law permitted 
only those dealers in the market prior to April 10, 1933, to sell the unadver­
tised milk at the 1-cent lower price.  This provision was declared invalid 
in the Mayflower Farms Inc. vs. Ten Eyck, in 1936. 
The Director of the Division of Milk Control in the State of New York 
has indicated that the Division has had to go through considerable litigation 
with the New York State Guernsey Breeders Cooperative Association, Inc., 
which had ref used to pay, or permit its buying dealers to pay, into the equali­
zation pools as provided for the Niagara Frontier and Rochester milk orders. 
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producers to make payments into the equalization fund as well as upholding 
the validity of the two milk orders.  In a recent case, Seneca Guernsey 
Farms vs. Holton V. Noyes, decided December 3, 1940, the Court of Appeals 
upheld the commissioner in refusing to grant this organization a license with 
the following statement, "  .  .  .  if a license is granted to applicants, it will 
tend to disturb the stability of the market and bring about a decreased return 
to producers.  In short, it will tend to a destructive competition in a market 
already adequately served, and it does not appear to be in the public 
interest." 
Experiences with the Wisconsin milk control law in the courts provide 
an excellent backlog of precedence for other states.  The most important 
case in Wisconsin was the State ex rel Finnegan vs. Lincoln Dairy Company, 
in which the Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld the 1935 milk control law, 
declaring that price fixing is not unlawful, and the milk control law is not 
class legislation ; an invalid delegation of legislative power was not granted. 
In the case of Gagnon vs. Department of Agriculture the court held that one 
applying for a license cannot in the same proceeding assert that the law is 
unconstitutional, and one making donations to hospitals that were in fact 
rebates and discounts, and selling overtest milk was properly denied a license. 
These same provisions were upheld in the case of Golden Harvest Dairy Co. 
vs. Department of Agriculture and Markets.  The only case lost by the de­
partment was the National Guernsey Dairy, Inc., vs. Department of Agri­
culture and Markets, in which the findings of the Department of Agriculture 
and Markets that the applicant was not "fit and equipped" were not sustained. 
Evidence of "lack of sufficient capital" was insufficient.  The company went 
bankrupt 2 months later. 
Two other cases have been argued before the Supreme Court of Wis­
consin ; one relative to the Department's authority to restrain a producer-
dealer from operating in a market without a license ; and the other involving 
the Department's right to restrain retail stores from operation in violation 
of the market order with respect to sanitation and resale prices.  Decisions 
have not been handed down as yet (May 1941). 
In Alabama the most important case has been the H. G. Franklin vs. 
State of Alabama case in 1936, which involved the constitutionality of the 
act, but the court upheld the act and stated that it did not violate the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution. 
The two leading cases in CaliforniaRay vs. Parker, decided by the 
California Supreme Court on April 11, 1940, and Jerseymaid Milk Products 
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California law but have failed.  In the Ray case the method used by the 
Department of Agriculture in fixing producer prices was attacked.  This de­
cision has especially speeded the administrative procedure of the control 
agency and provides solid groundwork for establishment of equitable prices. 
The Connecticut cases of Pierpont vs. Milk Board and Milk Producer 
Dealer Association vs. Milk Board of 1933 are the most important court 
decisions in that state.  These plaintiffs challenged the validity of the equali­
zation plan after the board had attempted to enforce an injunction for failure 
to pay into the equalization pool.  The court held that there was no specific 
or implied grant of power to support the equalization plan.  The board 
dropped the plan and refunded all equalization money in its possession. 
In Indiana the outstanding case, so far as is known, is the case of Milk 
Board vs. Frank Albert and Delbert Schafer in the Superior Court and 
Frank Albert and Delbert Schafer vs. Milk Board in the Supreme Court of 
Indiana in 1936.  The Milk Board brought the producer-distributors to trial 
for failure to take out licenses.  The pair challenged the Milk Board's right 
of access to books, designation of natural marketing areas, allotting producer 
bases, establishing reasonable trade practices, provisions for market-wide 
pools, deductions from payments made by distributors to producers, and the 
fixing of minimum prices to producers or resale. The Superior Court upheld 
the Milk Board and the decision was appealed to the Indiana Supreme Court, 
which sustained the act ;  sustained the lower court which held that the 
Milk Board had no authority over out-of-state milk ;  that the legislature 
had no power to compel an appellate court to decide a case in 90 days. 
As far as is known, there have been no important court cases regarding 
the milk control law in the state of Massachusetts.  Several cases have 
reached the Superior Court, and all have been decided in favor of the milk 
control board. 
The most important case in New Hampshire has been the Ferreti vs. 
Jackson case in 1936, which declared the New Hampshire law unconstitu­
tional.  This decision has been discussed in other parts of this report. 
The constitutionality of the New Jersey act was upheld in the case of 
State vs. Newark Milk Company.  In this case the issue was selling milk at 
prices less than those specified by the board. 
The Oregon law has withstood several attacks as to its constitutionality. 
The principal cases were Meyer et al vs. Milk Control Board and Brandes 
Creamery in 1936, and Board vs. Oldenberg, and Savage and Fox vs. State, 
in 1938.  In the first case mentioned, Meyer sought to enjoin the pooling pro­
visions of the law and attacked the constitutionality of the minimum price 53  ECONOMIC CONTROL OF THE MARKET MILK INDUSTRY 
fixing provisions.  The court upheld the price fixing, licensing, and market-
wide pooling but declared void the section that exempted producer-distributors 
from the pooling and base-rating provisions.  In the second case mentioned, 
Board vs. Oldenberg, the Milk Control Board was able to prosecute a pro­
ducer-distributor for failing to get a license.  In the last case mentioned, 
Savage and Fox vs. State, the plaintiffs were producer-distributors who tried 
to prevent the Milk Control Board from setting up pooling and production 
quotas involving themselves.  The Circuit Court upheld the act and after 
being appealed to the Oregon Supreme Court the appellants again lost. 
An interesting case evolved from the courts of Pennsylvania in 1936 pit­
ting Rohrer's Med-O-Farms Dairy vs. Milk Control Board.  In this case 
Rohrer had willfully paid his producers less than the minimum prices, and 
the board ordered him to cease and desist from operating as a milk dealer. 
The Court of Common Pleas upheld the Board, but upon appeal to the 
Superior Court the decision was reversed and the act was declared uncon­
stitutional.  The case eventually ended up in the United States Supreme 
Court that upheld the Board and the Court of Common Pleas. 
Two cases in Virginia are worthy of mention. The case of R. J. Reyn­
olds vs. Milk Commission was settled in March 1935 by the Supreme Court 
of Appeals. The Milk Commission enjoined the plaintiff and two other pro­
ducer-distributors from selling milk without a license and selling below prices 
set by the commission.  The court held that the act did not contravene the 
Virginia Constitution nor the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Con­
stitution.  The other case brought the Highlands Farms Dairy, Inc., and 
Luther W. High against the Milk Commission. The plaintiffs tried to enjoin 
the Milk Commission from enforcing certain orders on grounds of delegation 
of legislative powers, attempting to regulate interstate commerce, and the 
denial of due process of law. Upon losing in the Circuit Court the plaintiffs 
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, but both courts upheld the act 
and confirmed the powers of the State to fix the retail price of milk sold 
within the state even when obtained from outside sources. 
Little is known relative to the court cases involving milk control in the 
states of Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Montana, and Maine.  A recent 
Supreme Court decision in Florida held the act constitutional.  The State 
Supreme Court of Louisiana held certain parts of the Louisiana act uncon­
stitutional on February 7, 1940.  Those sections declared invalid had em­
powered the milk commission to make all necessary rules and regulations for 
carrying out the act and to provide penalties for violation of the rules and 
regulations.  The Maine act is undergoing its test as to constitutionality. 54  OREGON STATE COLLEGE-STUDIES IN ECONOMICS 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS 
It is difficult to measure objectively the administrative success of a con­
trol agency, and subjective evaluations may vary.  Perhaps the number of 
orders and court cases can be used as a yardstick for measuring the success 
of the state control agencies. Even this method fails to present a true picture, 
because there are a great many factors complicating the enforcement agency's 
problems.  It is apparent from the wording of the laws which ones are 
likely to be the most effective.  The legislators enacted the more stringent 
laws with the full intent of alleviating the demoralized economic conditions 
in the milk industry.  Whether the law has accomplished the established pur­
poses depends on the complications in the milk markets and the determination 
exhibited by the control agency in making the members of the milk industry 
"toe the line." A law good on paper can be nullified by a weak enforcement 
agency ; being politically appointed, the agency may f ear political repercus­
sions if it becomes too stringent. The location and structure of a market may 
make a good law less effective than that of a neighboring state operating with 
a mediocre law under different conditions.  Factors such as quantities of 
interstate milk, a large number of producer-distributors, excess of surplus 
milk, many small distributors, and producers that are unorganized  can vary 
the effectiveness of a law regardless of the supervision of the control agency. 
Perhaps the number of markets in which a control agency is operating 
can be used to measure objectively the success of a milk control law.  After 
all, the success of any law depends on the response accorded it by those con­
cerned, particularly the public.  The milk control laws are especially de­
pendent on public support to maintain them.  Paradoxically, when public 
hearings are held on milk control matters, very few consumers  appear in 
order to protect their interests. 
The establishment of marketing areas is one of the major problems con­
fronting the control agency, especially where surplus milk is prevalent and 
base-rating and pooling provisions are to be used.  If there were no surplus 
milk, base-rating and pooling provisions would not be needed, and every pro­
ducer's milk would be used for the purpose yielding the highest  returns. 
Where surplus milk is a problem, those fortunate producers near the market 
want the market boundary line to follow their back fence so all their milk 
will be used for the highest class.  Then they will not have to share the mar­
ket with producers farther out, who when admitted to the market, add to the 
surplus.  In recent hearings on the Portland, Oregon, metropolitan milk 
market, several groups argued against the extension of the Portland milkshed. 
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remunerative advantage gained by restricting the milkshed, thereby avoiding 
any increase in surplus milk.  The Oregon Milk Board is not the only con­
trol agency that has been confronted with this problem ; no doubt the majority 
of the other agencies are faced with propositions by various groups either to 
extend or limit the milkshed of a particular market.  It is easy to imagine 
the problems confronting the authorities administering the New York metro­
politan milk market, with its milkshed extending over an area of 100,000 
square miles and being supplied by 60,000 individual producers.  (18) 
This particular problem is further aggravated where resale prices are set 
in a particular market without any restrictions as to who may deliver milk to 
that market.  If the prices are too high in comparison with adjacent markets, 
milk will flow toward the higher prices, adding further to the surplus milk, 
thereby lowering the returns obtained by all producers supplying the market. 
Should resale prices be set lower than the adjacent milk markets and milk be 
allowed to flow toward the higher prices, the city or market area might find 
itself short of milk for fluid consumption.  Besides these obvious results 
there are many other demoralizing reverberations occurring as a result of 
such milk movement. 
The establishment and enforcement of resale prices is perhaps the most 
delicate problem that milk control agencies are required to solve.  All states 
except Connecticut and New York have the power to set resale prices.  It is 
interesting to note the number of states that consider the establishment and 
maintenance of resale prices as their biggest problem.  In order to obtain 
complete compliance with such orders a great deal of enforcement and in­
vestigation is required.  It appears as though the small dealers and producer-
distributors cause the greatest trouble, but the majority of milk control 
agencies are agreed that as long as milk has not been definitely established as 
a public utility, the only way to control producer-distributors is through retail 
prices.  The evasion of resale price schedules does not necessarily take place 
merely by selling milk at lower prices than those scheduled ; the underhand 
methods of "chiseling" and various unfair trade practices are the ones most 
commonly used and the hardest to detect.  The following quotation from a 
letter of May 16, 1941, received from Mr. Theodore Macklin, Associate 
Chief, Department of Agriculture and Markets for California, illustrates one 
of these underhand methods. 
"As regards unfair practices, we find these most difficult to discourage.
Unfair trade practices and violations of the resale orders of the Department,
particularly as affecting wholesale prices to restaurants and grocery stores,  are 
difficult to discover and punish because the person who receives the benefits is  as 
reluctant to testify on the subject as the person who gives the inducements.  In­
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or equipment are some of the practices we are endeavoring to discourage.  Dur­
ing the past twelve months we have uncovered several of the more flagrant
practices, a development which resulted in heavy fines upon the violators.  One 
fine alone was in the sum of $2,500, another in the sum of $1,000. Through these
means a sum in excess of $10,000 was imposed as penalties on seven or eight 
distributors." 
"Chiseling," as it influences resale prices, is even harder to detect than 
many of the unfair trade practices, especially where milk is not resold by 
butterfat content.  The practice of chiseling is accomplished by the sale of 
milk at the prices scheduled, but by increasing the butterfat in milk the 
product becomes more valuable while selling without an increase in price ; 
thus in effect a price reduction is accomplished.  In order completely to con­
trol this method of evading established resale prices, expensive administration 
would be necessary.  Compliance is most satisfactorily accomplished through 
imposition of heavy fines on those detected selling milk at prices other than 
scheduled for a certain butterfat percentage. 
As has been mentioned, resale price fixing is largely dependent for its 
long-run existence on the public reactions to it.  It is interesting to note that 
retail price fixing powers of state control agencies are now under attack 
from consumer groups in California, Florida, Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
Oregon, and Virginia.  (10)  Governor Robert A. Hurley of Connecticut in 
a message to the 1941 state legislature summarized the arguments against 
resale price fixing as follows :  (13) 
"I now wish to point out that as long as the present milk control law remains
in effect and operates as it has in the past, Connecticut dairy farmers have little
hope for sufficient increases in the sale of fluid milk to bring about any material
gains in their income and there is virtually no prospect of consumers being en­
couraged to buy more milk." 
* * * 
"The present policy of fixing both buying (by dealer) and selling (to con­
sumer) prices, thus freezing dealer margins, has extended to milk dealers public
utility rights without affording the dairy farmer and the consumer the protection
which invariably accompanies the use of government authority in this country
when public service enterprises are guaranteed the collection of definite charges." 
* * * 
"In regulating a public utility the State does not force the public to pay a
specified price, without at the same time determining that the price is fair, the
profits of the company are reasonable and the service is efficient and not being
duplicated." 
* * * 
"Such a plan (minimum prices to producers only) of milk control, followed
by New York and other states, as well as by the Federal Government, affords all
dealers a genuine opportunity in which to develop and adopt more efficient
methods and practices in the distribution and handling of milk so as to reduce
costs and increase the volume of sales for their own direct benefit.  Producers 
gain in income through the increased sales while consumers are able to obtain
greater amounts of milk at the lower prices made possible by greater efficiency 
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Governor Hurley's recommendations were accepted by the legislature. 
The Wisconsin milk control law expires on December 31, 1941, but 
the legislature is working on a new milk control bill.  Quoting from a letter 
received from the milk control division of that state, (7) "From all appear­
ances, the new legislation if enacted at all, will prohibit consumer prices 
except in an emergency and will require the producer prices to be based on 
the value of manufacturing milk."  Apparently resale prices have been under 
attack in the state of Wisconsin also. 
The enforcement of prices to producers has not been as difficult as the 
policing of minimum resale prices.  The majority of the control agencies 
proceed with enforcement by carefully auditing distributor's books to make 
sure that producers are receiving prices and returns properly due them. 
Evasion is more difficult and should a producer feel that he is being cheated 
he does not hesitate in notifying the officials.  The principal difficulty arises 
in establishing satisfactory producer prices.  This is especially true where 
producers are not under agreement to a cooperative and can dispose of their 
milk as they see fit.  Tinley reports (23) in his observations of the operations 
of control agencies that "probably much of the difficulty experienced by the 
various boards resulted from their attempts to stabilize producer prices at a 
higher level than economic conditions warranted." 
Several of the states provide for the establishment of producer prices 
based on the value of manufacturing milk, but California appears to have a 
more workable system than most states in this respect.  The California law 
not only provides that the Department of Agriculture and Markets shall 
establish prices to producers based on manufacturing prices but also provides 
an automatic sliding scale that will change the producer prices when economic 
conditions change sufficiently.  As producer prices change, resale prices 
change in the same ratio and in the same direction.  By this method any 
increase in prices to consumers is passed on directly to the producer, and the 
distributor has to be satisfied with the same amount of spread.  Whenever 
conditions warrant a price change, in most marketing areas the change is 
5 cents per pound butterfat.  Using a quart of 4 per cent milk as the basis, 
this change of 5 cents in producer prices results in a change of approximately 
cent per quart up or down in retail prices. 
Intermingled with the problem of determining equitable producer 
prices are the problems of equalization and producer bases.  These mechan­
isms are almost essential wherever surplus milk is a problem.  It has been 
the experience of most agencies that unless market-wide pooling is established 
in a market, continuous bickering can be expected, even when individual-
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their milk, the market will be unsettled.  Producer bases are merely methods 
of limiting the supply of milk available for a given market area.  They are 
used with the hope of obtaining a somewhat even yearly production of milk, 
because the farmers are normally interested in producing only what they can 
sell within their quota or base. 
Another problem that confronts milk control agencies and that is more 
distressing in the more highly populated eastern states is the problem of 
interstate shipment of milk.  At first such states as New York, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island, which require more milk than their home 
producers can supply, attempted to put all producers and distributors at the 
same starting point by declaring that any distributor buying milk out of the 
state shall pay the producer in another state the same price required to be 
paid producers in the home state, and vice versa.  This was a satisfactory 
barrier until adverse court decisions prevented states from controlling the 
interstate shipment of milk.  It was almost inevitable that the only solution 
lay in asking Federal authorities to establish marketing agreements in co­
operation with the states in those markets receiving considerable interstate 
milk.  The state law is enacted complementary to the federal agreement to 
control intrastate milk and to establish resale prices where permissible.  This 
situation confronting milk control agencies is illustrated in a statement by 
J. A. Rogers, Secretary of the New Jersey Milk Control Board, that 
"Enforcement of the New Jersey Act would be far simpler if it were not 
for the importation of out-of-state milk at low prices.  It may be necessary 
for New Jersey to obtain Federal cooperation to control this situation." 
The states do have power to regulate the milk once it comes to rest 
within their state even though it has been shipped in interstate commerce. 
Dealers are finding a way of circumventing this limitation in Pennsylvania by 
having milk shipped to market on consignment, which puts the shipment 
outside the control of the state milk commission.  (9) Evidently New Hamp­
shire has had the same difficulty because an amendment to the milk control 
law passed during the 1941 legislative session specifies that anyone receiving 
milk on consignment shall be classified as a distributor.  (11) 
A development arising from certain exemptions granted cooperatives by 
the milk control laws has been the establishment of "bogus" cooperatives by 
producer-distributors or distributors.  The majority of states allow the pro­
ducers' association to blend proceeds from sales and to make the necessary 
deductions for expenses.  Several of these psuedo-cooperatives appear to 
have been organized in certain eastern states to benefit the organizers and 
not the producers.  Wisconsin and New York especially have had to combat 
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ficulties with cooperatives.  In the recent (1941) session of the California 
legislature a bill was introduced that would throw the necessary safeguards 
around cooperatives handling milk of their members on a cooperative basis 
and still preserve the effectiveness of the milk control act.  The Legislative 
News Letter of May 20, 1941, explains the bill as follows : 
"Recognizing the fundamental right under the laws of the State and the
nation for producers to join together into cooperatives to conduct their own
business, this bill would prevent the setting up of so-called 'phony' cooperatives
to circumvent the Milk Control Act.  Specifically, it requires the cooperative
association to first compute and report to its producer-members that amount
which each would receive under the stabilization and marketing plan; requires
written monthly statements of any deductions made for reserves for working
capital, necessary operating expenses, etc.; and prohibits hiding of one class of 
expenditure within another.  It does, however, recognize the fundamental right
of a cooperative to retain from marketing proceeds the amounts required in the 
conduct of its business.  The cooperative is nothing more than a 'producers' 
enterprise,' and as an association of producers is entitled to enjoy the same rights
and privileges as any individual producer or a partnership composed of pro­
ducers." (22) 
The foregoing quotation may give a clearer picture of how these 
"bogus" cooperatives have tried to .circumvent the several milk control laws. 
No action has yet been taken on this measure. 
Licensing, collection of fees, unfair trade practices, and examination of 
books and records consume the greater amount of time of the administration 
and enforcement officials in the several states.  It is recognized that many 
difficulties are encountered by state milk control agencies that have not been 
discussed in this report, but the problems here discussed appear to be the 
ones that are most troublesome. 
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1941). Table 1.  POWERS OF MILK CONTROL AGENCY 
State investigational powers 
Alabama.  Board may super­
vise production, production-dis­
tribution, transportation, man­
ufacturing,  storage,  distribu­
tion, delivery, processing and
sale of milk.  Access to  all 
books, reports, and papers at
reasonable hours.  May sub­
poena records and persons. In­
formation required to be kept
confidential except at court. 
Licensing powers 
May revoke  licenses.  Pro­
ducer or producer-distributors
do not have to get license if
milk produced is consumed on
the premises; do not have to
sell at prices fixed by Board;
must meet health laws.  Ex­
tension of business needs ap­
proval of Board. Approval de­
pends on quantity of milk in
market, effect on public inter­
est, capability of dealer finan­
cially, etc. 
Bonding 
If distributors buy­
ing milk from pro­
ducers fail  to pay
for  milk  without
just cause within
regular  periods,
Board may require
bond in sum twice 
the amount of pur­
chases for past 15
days. 
Regulation of unfair competi­
tion and trade practices 
Specific unfair trade practices
are set up in the 1939 amend­
ment for the Board to follow: 
May promulgate rules and
regulations;  prevent  false 
and misleading advertising;
prevent misrepresentation of
product; prevent sales pro­
motion schemes. 
It is also the declared purpose
of the act to prevent demoral­
izing trade practices. 
Cooperation with
other authorities 
Authorized  to  co­
operate with other
authorities to effec­
tuate the purpose of
the AAA and State 
Milk Control Act. 
Mediation and 
arbitration 
On application of
any affected person
board can mediate 
disputes. Decisions
are to be conclu­
sive and binding on
parties involved. 
Limitations and exceptions 
Act applies in an area only
on petition.  Does not alter or 
supersede any existing health
laws.  Does not apply to pro­
ducer supplying milk for a 
processor.  Does not apply to
canned milk. 
o, 
California. Director may make
investigations  and  prosecute
violators of the act.  May ad­
minister oaths and issue sub­
poenas, examine books and rec­
ords.  Investigate all transac­
tions between dealers and pro­
ducers, etc.  Amend wholesale 
and retail prices after public
hearing. Require reports from
distributors.  Information  to 
be kept confidential except at 
court. 
Where marketing agreement
in effect, all distributors must
be licensed.  Producers sup­
plying distributors and retail
stores need no license, but pro­
ducers are required to be reg­
istered.  Licenses may be re­
fused, suspended, or revoked
on proper hearing.  Licensee 
has right to appeal from action
of control agency. 
$1,000 minimum
for distributors 
buying  less  than
100 gallons per
day,  $2,000  less 
than  200,  $3,000
less than 300, and
$5,000 over 300. 
Any stabilization and market­
ing plan shall have provisions
for  prohibiting  distributors 
from engaging in the follow­
ing  unfair  practices:  pay­
ment, allowance or acceptance
of secret rebates or refunds,
etc.; giving of milk or cream,
etc., except to bona fide chari­
ties;  extension  of  special
prices or services to certain
customers and not to all; false
or misleading advertising; pur­
chase of fluid milk in excess of 
100 gallons monthly from pro­
ducer or  association  of pro­
ducers unless a written con­
tract has been entered into. 
By application and
approval  of  local 
control Board the 
director may con­
fer  or enter into 
agreement with any
state, local, or fed­
eral  authority  to 
aid  in  stabilizing
milk  and  cream 
distribution. 
No provision.  Director authorized to order 
a board to desist in any action 
not  in  accordance with the 
Act.  Educational and sales 
program for fluid milk shall
not be  detrimental  to  other 
products.  Agreements may 
not  permit  development  of 
monopolies in either produc­
tion or distribution  of  fluid 
milk  or  cream.  Producers 
having less than 5 cows ex­
empt from provisions of Act. 
Connecticut.  Administrator 
may  investigate  production,
transportation, manufacturing,
storage, distribution, delivery
and  sale  of milk and milk 
products. Supported by power 
to:  subpoena persons, books,
etc., and administer oaths; en­
ter any place where milk is
handled; inspect all books, etc.,
any place within the  state;
may require dealers to keep
records.  Information obtained 
does not have to be kept con­
fidential. 
All dealers distributing or sell­
ing milk within the State (ex­
cept for consumption on prem­
ises where sold) must be  li­
censed and license plates are
provided.  Must comply with
state  sanitary  requirements.
Licenses may be refused, sus­
pended, or revoked after due
notice and public hearing for
unfair  dealings,  inability  to 
perform duties, failure to file
bond or failure to make pay­
ment for milk. 
May require bond­
ing of licensee if
he fails to pay for milk delivered 
within two months. 
The bond is double 
the  value  of  the 
milk purchased the
preceding month. 
Elimination of unfair and de­
moralizing trade practices  is 
one of the methods by which
the purposes of the act are
to be achieved.  Specific pow­
ers are given to prevent such
practices from reducing the
price below the minimum es­
tablished.  Administrator has 
power to define unfair trade
practices after public hearing. 
In order to secure 
uniform milk con­
trol  the  adminis­
trator shall confer 
and cooperate with
the legally  consti­
tuted authorities of 
the United States 
and  other  states 
subject to required
federal approval. 
Controversies be­
tween dealers, pro­
ducers,  and  con­
sumers may be in­
vestigated on com­
plaint.  Findings 
are  binding  and 
final by agreement
of the  parties  in 
advance  of  the 
hearing. 
Shall not affect any contract
between a non-resident milk
dealer and a  resident milk 
producer or between a resident
dealer and non-resident pro­
ducer.  Nothing in the  act 
shall  relieve  other  state  of­
ficials from their statutory du­
ties with respect to the dairy
industry, nor alter other laws
or requirements as  to  milk. 
Dealers selling  less than 10 
quarts daily are exempt from
making reports to the admin­
istrator. Florida.  Investigate as emer­
gency permits and regulate as
emergency requires  all  mat­
ters pertaining to production,
manufacture,  storage,  trans­
portation, disposal, distribution,
and  sale  of milk and milk 
products in any market set up
in Florida; subpoena dealers
and records; administer oaths.
Any member of Board or em­
ployee designated may enter at
all reasonable hours all places
where milk is handled.  In­
spect all records and reports.
Shall  keep  all  information 
confidential except as required
to perform duties of Act. 
Georgia.  For purpose of en­
forcing  the  act,  the. Board,
through director or authorized 
agent,  shall  have access  to 
records and entrance  at  all 
reasonable hours where milk 
is handled.  Issue subpoenas
and administer oaths.  Infor­
mation  obtained  to  be kept
confidential. 
Indiana.  Board or its agent 
may  investigate  production,
transportation, storage, distri­
bution and sale of milk in the 
state.  May administer oaths
and issue subpoenas; inspect
pertinent books and records.
Information to be kept confi­
dential except in a court case.
To have access at all reason­
able hours  to  places where
milk is handled. 
All milk dealers in the state. 
Before license is granted, deal­
er must show board a certifi­
cate of health from city, coun­
ty, or state.  If health certifi­
cate  is  revoked, board shall
suspend license.  Where no 
law exists, dealer must show
certificate from inspector un­
der Milk Products Law that 
he complied with standards of
U. S. Public Health Service 
Ordinance.  Board may de­
cline to grant, suspend, or re­
voke a license or permit be­
cause: (a) dealer has rejected
milk without reasonable cause,
(b) failed to make payment,
and (c) failed to keep records
and committed act injurious to
public. 
Milk  dealer,  producer,  pro­
ducer-distributor,  and  store 
shall  obtain  a  license  and 
must satisfy board that he is
capable of performing his du­
ties.  Health certificate, if re­
quired  in  community, must
accompany application. Board
may suspend or revoke the
license of any distributor who
rejects milk without reasonable 
cause. 
All dealers within the  state 
and distributing brokers. May
suspend or revoke a license
on:  (1)  failure  to  make 
prompt payment for milk to
producers;  (2)  violation  of 
sanitary  requirements;  (3)
unsatisfactory evidence of  fi­
nancial responsibility. 
No provision. 
Surety  bond  by
distributor  buying
from producer  of 
not less than $2,000
nor more than $10,­
000.  May accept
cash deposited with
bank or trust com­
pany. 
Dealer must sub­
mit a bond or  fi­
nancial  statement 
indicating that he
can pay for a 60­
day supply of milk.
Exception: cooper­
ative selling to a
milk dealer. 
No specific mention of trade
practices that are unfair, but
it is declared unlawful to buy
or sell milk below prices set
by Board or at prices set if
rebates, free service, advertis­
ing allowance or other services
are offered  or  given.  May
establish reasonable rules or 
regulations for fair trade com­
petition. 
It is unlawful to buy or sell
below prices set by board or to 
grant  rebates,  free  services, 
etc. 
Establishment  of  reasonable 
trade practices is provided for,
although the power to prohibit
them arises from the declared 
purpose of the act. 
Board vested with 
authority to confer
with legally consti­
tuted authorities of 
other states of the 
U. S. with respect 
to  uniform  milk 
control  subject  to 
such  Federal  ap­
proval as may be
required by law. 
In order to secure 
uniform system of
milk control, Board
can confer and co­
operate with other
state  officials and 
United States  of­
ficials, including
Secretary of Agri­
culture, in effectua­
tion of purposes of
AAA. 
Power  to  confer 
and cooperate with
other  states  and 
United  States  in
order to secure a 
uniform system of
milk  control  and 
with health author­
ities as to sanitary
regulation. 
May act as arbi­
trator  and  medi­
ator  between  or 
among dealers and
producers but not
mandatory. 
No provision. 
To act as mediator 
or arbitrator in any
controversy be­
tween  or  among
dealers  and  pro­
ducers. 
Nothing in act to abrogate or
conflict with any public health
law or sanitary law.  Board 
not to regulate a natural mar­
keting area except upon peti­
tion from a group of repre­
sentative producers who peti­
tion the Board.  Board can not 
prevent milk being given to
charities.  Any producer milk­
ing 3 cows or less shall not
have to pay license fee but
shall  come under the  price
provisions. 
(1) Limit  operation  of  act 
only where election has been
held. 
(2) Licenses required shall be
in addition to any or all other
licenses required by law.
(3) Shall not conflict or repeal
or alter any existing law regu­
lating sanitation in production
and distribution  of milk or 
milk products.
(4) Nothing in this act shall
apply to any producer not hav­
ing more than six cows from
which he is selling milk. 
(1) Required number and vol­
ume of distributors to petition
the Board to act in an area. 
(2) Shall not prevent sale of
raw milk otherwise complying
with the act. 
(3) Act shall  not  alter any
other requirements or laws as
to health provisions.
(4) Cooperatives shall not be
prevented from making col­
lective sales or blending the
net proceeds.
(5) Surplus milk may be sold
by a licensed dealer to an un­
licensed dealer for manufac­
turing purposes. Table 1.  POWERS OF MILK CONTROL AGENCY(Continued) 
State investigational powers  Licensing powers  Bonding 
Regulation of unfair competi­
tion and trade practices 
Cooperation with
other authorities 
Mediation and 
arbitration  Limitations and exceptions 
Louisiana. Members of Com­
mission or its agents or em­
ployees shall have access to
any dairy, creamery, or any
place where milk is handled
or sold. 
No provision.  No  mention  but 
Commission had 
tried to bond deal­
ers.  A separate
bonding  act  was 
approved July  2, 
1940. 
No provision.  No provision.  No provision.  Act shall not be held to repeal
any authority or power vested
by law in the State Board of
hotel  or  restaurant  (except
with U. S. Public Health Ser­
vice Milk Ordinance. 
Maine.  Conduct  hearings,
subpoena and examine under
oath records, books, and ac­
counts.  May enter at all rea­
sonable hours all places where
milk is sold or distributed. 
All  dealers  and  producer-
dealers must be licensedex­
cept  persons  producing and
selling milk not in excess of
10 quarts daily on his prem­
ises  shall be required to be
licensed.  May decline,  sus­
pend, or revoke a license after
notice and hearing. 
No provision.  No method or device shall be 
lawful whereby milk is bought 
or  sold  at  prices  less than 
scheduled minimum whether 
by discount, rebate, free ser­
vice, etc. 
No provision.  May act  as arbi­
trator or mediator 
to settle any con­
troversy among or
between producers,
dealers,  producer-
dealers,  and con­
sumers. 
(1) Board shall not have pow­
er to nullify or amend any ex­
isting  sanitary  regulations.
(2) Producer who sells on his
own premises not exceeding
10 quarts daily shall not have
to pay fees or licenses. 
Massachusetts.  Board  has 
broad powers of investigation.
May investigate and regulate
market production zones, pro­
duction, manufacture, process­
ing,  storage,  transportation,
disposal, distribution, and sale
of milk and milk products;
hold hearings, subpoena wit­
nesses, inspect records.  May
enter (at all reasonable hours)
any place where milk is han­
dled.  Information to be kept
confidential. 
Each milk dealer (certain ex­
ceptions) must be licensed and
display license in his place of
business.  Board may suspend,
revoke, or grant a conditional
or limited license to an appli­
cant if certain provisions are
not met:  (1) accept and pay
for milk;  (2)  act  to reduce 
price so as to affect supply;
(3) party to a combination to
fix or maintain prices against
the act; (4) fail to keep rec­
ords;  (5) make false  state­
ments; (6) various other acts
not in good faith with the act. 
Under a  separate
act. Department of
Agriculture secures
bond or other se­
curity from dealers
who buy milk or 
cream  from  pro­
ducers. 
Board is charged with estab­
lishing reasonable trade prac­
tices.  Certain acts are unlaw­
ful and may result in revoca­
tion of the license. 
May confer  and 
enter  into  agree­
ments with author­
ities of other states 
and United States 
with respect to uni­
form milk control. 
Board  authorized 
to  arbitrate  any
controversy or  is­
sue among or be­
tween producers or
milk dealers. 
Act shall not affect any public
health rule or regulation. Ex­
empted as milk dealers:  (a)
hotel  or  restaurant  (except
soda  fountain)  which  sells 
milk to be consumed on the
premises and does not pur­
chase milk from producers;
(b) one who delivers raw milk
only to a milk dealer.  Pro­
ducer-distributor  selling  less 
than 50 quarts daily does not
have to pay assessment fee.
Resale prices may be estab­
lished only on petition of 25
per cent of producers in a
market.  State Act shall not 
conflict with a Federal agree­
ment where one is in effect. 
Montana.  May enter at all
reasonable  hours  all  places
where milk is produced, han­
dled, etc.; issue subpoenas and
administer oaths.  Require all
persons holding licenses to file
reports with the Board as to
production, sale, etc. of milk.
Information to be kept confi­
dential. 
Producers,  producer-distribu­
tors, and distributors must get
licenses.  May decline,  sus­
pend, or revoke a license upon
due cause and public hearing
for:  violation of Act, failure
to make required statements
or pay fees. 
No provision.  Board may adopt and enforce
all rules and orders necessary
to carry out the provisions of
this act.  Shall have power to
make and formulate, in any
established market, reasonable
rules and regulations govern­
ing fair trade practices as they
pertain to the transaction of
business among licensees un­
der this act within that mar-
In order to secure 
uniform milk con­
trol,  the  Board 
shall  confer  and 
cooperate with au­
thorities  of  other 
states  and  Secre­
tary of Agriculture
of  the United 
States. 
May act as medi­
ator  or  arbitrator 
to settle any con­
troversy  or  issue 
among or between
dealers  and  pro­
ducers  and  con­
sumers. 
Nothing in act shall abrogate
or affect public health laws.
Licenses required shall be in
addition to any other license
required in the state. 
ket. New  Hampshire.  Conduct 
hearings; subpoena producers,
distributors  and others;  in­
spect  books  and  accounts. 
Member of Board or its rep­
resentative may enter and ex­
amine (at all reasonable hours)
all places where milk is han­
dled. 
New Jersey.  Board empow­
ered to  investigate the  pro­
duction, importation, sale for
manufacture,  storage,  trans­
portation, disposal, distribution
and sale of milk in the state. 
May issue subpoenas for per­
sons, papers, and records. May
require records from distribu­
tors.  No mention made of 
keeping information obtained
confidential. 
New York.  Commissioner of 
Department  of  Agriculture
and Markets has power to
supervise  and  regulate  the 
milk industry and investigate
all  matters as to production
and handling of milk.  May:
(1) subpoena persons, records,
and reports;  (2)  enter any
place where milk is handled;
(3) administer oaths; (4) re­
quire records and reports to
be kept.  No provision that the
information received shall be 
kept confidential. 
Only distributors in markets
designated by the Board are
required to be licensed.  Li­
cense fees vary from $2 to $10
according to quantity of milk
sold.  Board does not have to 
hold a bearing upon refusing
a license. May suspend or re­
voke a license on due notice 
and public hearing. 
Every dealer must be licensed.
Board may decline, suspend,
or revoke a license because of: 
(1)  failure to pay for milk
purchased;  (2)  commitment
of an  act  injurious  to  the 
trade;  (3)  failure  to  keep
records;  (4) commitment of
an act against health  laws;
(5) making false statements. 
License milk dealers include 
brokers and cooperatives.  Ex­
empt: hotels, restaurants, and
dealers selling only to distrib­
utors.  Sales of milk outside 
the state not included in de­
termining license fee nor milk
used for manufacturing prod­
ucts.  May decline to grant,
suspend, or revoke a license
for any one of several reasons. 
Under separate law
not in the Act. Per­
sons  buying milk
or cream within the 
State shall be bond­
ed  or  else make 
satisfactory  show­
ing as to real estate
ownership  in  the 
state. 
Under a separate 
act.  Bond dealers,
sub - dealers,  and 
processors. 
Dealers buying
milk  from  pro­
ducers  for  resale 
or  manufacturing
must  be  bonded
for not less than 
$2,000,  based  on 
amount  of  milk 
handled.  If  can 
satisfy as to finan­
cial  position, may
be exempt.  (Only
natural persons or
a domestic corpor­
ation). 
No mention of unfair trade 
practices yet a purpose of the
Act is  to maintain fair and 
lawful trade practices.  Pro­
vide against unfair trade prac­
tices in the agreements. 
Board authorized to control or 
prevent  unfair,  unjust,  de­
structive,  and  demoralizing
practices. 
Nothing specifically mentioned
as to prohibiting unfair com­
petition and trade  practices.
Certain acts, though, are pro­
hibited or can result in revo­
cation of the license. 
Board  is  author­
ized to confer and 
agree with legally
constituted similar 
boards  of  other 
states or with agen­
cies of the Feder­
al Government for 
purpose of assur­
ing  an  adequate
milk supply for the
State. 
Board may enter
into agreements
with state, county,
municipal,  and 
Federal Govern­
ments. Agreements
must be ratified by
a majority of the
board  before  be­
coming effective. 
Authorized to con­
fer with other au­
thorities  with  re­
spect to achieving
uniform milk con­
trol within the 
state  or  between 
states  and  with
Federal  Govern­
ment.  The act is 
not  operative  in 
New  York  City
unless in coopera­
tion with Federal 
authorities. 
Board shall secure 
the cooperation of
those  engaged  in 
the  industry  to 
maintain fair and 
lawful trade prac­
tices.  No  other 
mention of media­
tion  and  arbitra­
tion. 
May mediate  or
arbitrate issues 
among and between
producers, milk
dealers,  and  con­
sumers. 
Commissioner of 
Department of Ag­
riculture and Mar­
kets to act as me­
diator between pro­
ducers and dealers. 
(1)  Shall  supplement  but 
not be in lieu of existing laws
relating to transportation, in­
spection, and testing of milk,
and laws relating to  public
health. 
(2) Cooperatives shall not be
prohibited from blending and
distributing their proceeds.
(3) Exempt from definition of
distributor:  (a) one who sells
milk  for  consumption  on 
premises,  (b)  producer who
sells milk to distributor only. 
(1) Nothing in the  act  au­
thorizes board to establish or 
enforce sanitary  regulations,
or conflict with health laws in 
effect. 
(2) Milk utilized  for manu­
facturing purposes  shall  not 
be used to determine the li­
cense fee. 
(3) Sales by a milk dealer of
milk bought in or out of the
state and sold out of the state 
not included in license deter. 
mi nation. 
( 4) If  municipality  revokes
or suspends a  license  of a 
dealer, the board shall auto­
matically suspend its  license 
until dealer allowed to operate
by the city. 
(1) Act applies to New York
City but shall  not alter  its 
sanitary requirements.
(2) No health officer of any
county, city, or village shall 
approve  an  additional  milk 
supply without first satisfying
the Commission that the added 
supply is necessary for the city
and will not deprive another
city of its supply.
(3) Milk utilized in manufac­
tured products not to be used
in determining license fee. State investigational powers
 
Oregon.  Board may investi­
gate production, manufacture,
storage, transportation, distri­
bution, and sale of milk. Pow­
er of Board to investigate shall
be with Oregon State College.
Board may issue  subpoenas
and administer oaths; exam­
ine records and accounts of 
dealers;  take  deposition  of
witnesses within or without 
the state. 
Pennsylvania.  Board or an 
employee designated for  the 
purpose  is  vested with  the 
power to investigate all mat­
ters pertaining to the milk in­
dustry and establish reasonable
trade  practices,  systems  of 
production control, and mar­
keting area enforcement com­
mittees.  May issue subpoenas
of  persons,  papers, and re­
ports; enter premises handling
milk;  administer oaths; and
inspect books, papers,  or re­
ports.  Board may require
dealers to keep records and re­
ports.  Information to be kept
confidential. 
Licensing powers
 
Licensing of dealers is man­
datory, except Board has dis­
cretionary powers to license in
markets of 15,000 population
or less.  May specify in what
market  the  license  applies.
Board may decline to grant,
suspend, or revoke license, up­
on due notice and opportunity
to be heard, for:  (1) failure
to pay for milk; (2) commit­
ted an act injurious to public
health; (3) carried on unfair
trade practices; (4) failed to
keep records, etc. 
Milk  dealers  are  licensed. 
Without a  license,  a dealer 
shall not buy for purpose of 
storage,  processing, manufac­
turing, distribution, or sale of
milk within  or  without  the 
state.  Exemptions from  li­
censes:  (1) dealers handling
less than 1,500 pounds in any
month; (2) dealers selling in 
a  community  of  less  than 
1,000 population;  (3)  stores. 
May decline to grant, suspend,
or revoke a license for various 
causes,  i.e.,  failure  to  pay,
rejected milk,  etc.  Commis­
sion issues permits for weigh­
ing or measuring to each milk
dealer, fee $5 annually.  But­
terfat tester must be certified 
by the Commission, fee $3 an­
nually. 
Table I.  POWERS OF MILK CONTROL AGENCY(Continued) 
Regulation of unfair competi- Cooperation with
Bonding  tion and trade practices  other authorities 
Bonding not re- Board shall have power to pre- Board may confer,
quired.  vent unfair methods of com- cooperate, and en-
petition and unfair trade prac- ter into pacts with
tices.  The act was enacted to  other state and 
prevent  unhealthful,  unfair,  Federal authorities 
unjust,  destructive, and de- with a view of ob­
moralizing trade practices.  taining a more uni­
form  system  of 
milk control. 
Applicant  for  li- The board is specifically vest- Board  is  author­
cense must file  a  ed with power to investigate ized to confer and
personal bond ap- and regulate trade practices.  cooperate with
proved by  the  other agencies with
board.  If personal  respect to uniform
bond  is  not  ade- control within the 
quate, must post a state and between 
surety or collateral states and Federal 
bond of $100,000  Government. 
or  less.  Coopera­
tives do not have 
to file a bond. Sub-
dealer  pays  $300
bond for every
route owned or op­
erated. 
Mediation and 
arbitration
 
May mediate or ar­
bitrate any contro­
versial measures 
among or between
producers and deal­
ers. 
Not specifically pro­
vided in the Act. 
Limitations and exceptions 
(1) Definition  of  milk  pre­
vents the Board from fixing
prices of factory milk.
(2) Producer  means  person
producing milk within Oregon.
(3) Denies  right  of  Board 
(formerly exercised) to issue
state-wide orders with respect 
to  prices,  pooling,  and pro­
ducer  quotas;  and  requires
that each market area and pro­
duction area shall include that 
territory in which conditions
are similar. 
(4) Act shall not conflict with
any other law as to health and
sanitation. 
(5) Producer-distributor with
one cow does not have to be 
licensed or pay poundage fee. 
(1) No price fixing for milk 
sold  to consumers for  con­
sumption on the premises.
(2) Stores exempted from li­
cense  if  selling milk all  of 
which  is  bought from a  li­
censed dealer. 
(3) Act  shall  not apply  to 
milk shipped into the state in
tanks and used only for manu­
facturing purposes.
(4) Act shall not conflict with
any law  relating  to  public
health.
(5) In  some  cases,  board 
must have approval of Gover­
nor before acting. Rhode Island.  Board vested 
with  powers  to  investigate
production,  importation,  stor­
age,  transportation,  disposal,
distribution, and sale of milk
as may be necessary to carry
out the provisions of this act.
May subpoena any person who
would aid in administration of 
the act; compel production of
books, records, and accounts;
administer oaths; enter at all
reasonable times places where
milk is produced or handled.
Information does not have to 
be kept confidential.
 
Vermont. Ample powers grant­
ed the board to investigate all
phases of the milk industry.
Board may conduct hearings,
subpoena persons and records,
and administer oaths.  Board 
or representative may enter (at
all reasonable hours) all places
where milk is produced, han­
dled, distributed, or sold. 
Virginia.  Commission  em­
powered to investigate all mat­
ters pertaining to the produc­
tion, transportation and sale of
milk in Virginia.  May sub­
poena  persons,  reports,  and 
records.  May enter all places
where milk is handled.  All 
information obtained must be 
kept confidential.
 
Wisconsin.  Duty of Depart­
ment of Agriculture and Mar­
kets is to determine whether 
"economic unbalance or unem­
ployment" continues to exist
or no longer exists in the milk
industry. May: enter (within
reasonable hours) any prem­
ises  handling milk;  conduct 
hearings,  administer  oaths, 
subpoena persons and records. 
Mandatory that every dealer
shall have a license except:
(1) where milk is consumed
on premises; (2) store obtain­
ing all its milk from licensed
dealers.  May suspend or re­
voke a license on  13  listed 
grounds.  Act provides  that 
no license shall be issued to a 
foreign corporation unless  it 
is qualified to do business in
the state as by law. 
Licensing of dealers confined
to markets designated as mar­
keting areas by the board. Pro­
ducers selling milk for con­
sumption must be licensed ex­
cept those who sell  in other 
states, or to creameries, or sell 
less  than  10  quarts  daily.
Board may decline a license
after opportunity to be heard,
and may suspend or revoke a
license after due notice and 
public hearing.
 
License all distributors in any

designated market. Board may
suspend or revoke a license
after due notice and public
hearing. 
All dealers require a license 
except:  (1) producers distrib­
uting  less  than  ten  quarts
daily;  (2) a dealer operating
a store.  License fee is  re­
tained  by  the  department
whether license  is issued or 
not.  License may be denied, 
suspended,  or revoked after 
notice and hearing. 
No provision. 
Not required. 
No bonding specifi­
cations, but in two
of twelve markets,
board has required
bonding by official
regulation. 
Department may at
any time require a
licensee  to  file  a 
surety bond. 
Not  specifically  mentioned. 
May decline to grant a license
or may revoke a  license  if 
such practices are carried out.
Unlawful to buy or sell below
prices set by Board, whether
by discounts, rebate, free ser­
vices, etc. 
No mention in the law--but 
the board shall procure the co­
operation of those engaged in
the milk industry to maintain
fair and lawful trade practices
through  its  licensing power.
May suspend or revoke a li­
cense for carrying on such
practices.  Anyone intimidat­
ing producer, causing him to
withdraw from producers' as­
sociation is  guilty of unfair
discrimination.
 
No specific powers in the law,

but powers appear implicit in
enforcing the act.  Elimination 
of such practices is one of the
law's objectives. 
Department is empowered to
eliminate such methods and 
practices in connection with
the distribution of regulated
milk.  Have power to enjoin
a person from employing prac­
tices that are detrimental and 
tend to cause needless waste 
and duplication. 
Authorized to con­
fer and cooperate
with other agencies,
especially  with
Federal Govern­
ment, so as to bring
about uniform milk 
control. 
Board  is  author­
ized to confer and 
cooperate with oth­
er agencies to bring
about a uniformity
in regulations and
assure an adequate
and  proper  milk 
supply in Vermont. 
With a view of se­
curing  uniformity
of  milk  control,
commission has 
power  to  confer 
and cooperate with
other agencies. 
Contains  no  pro­
vision conferring
authority upon the
department to  co­
operate with other
agencies. 
Not specifically mentioned, but
board shall endeav­
or to effect amica­
ble reconciliation 
of differences bet-
tween various milk 
interests. 
Not mentioned. 
But mandatory that
the board procure
the cooperation of
those  engaged  in
the industry to
maintain fair and 
lawful trade prac­
tices. 
Empowered to act
as mediator or ar­
bitrator  in  any
controversial  issue 
among or between
producers and dis­
tributors. 
Not specified or in­
ferred. 
Act shall in no way conflict
with other laws relating to
milk.  Exceptions as to licens­
ing powers:  (1)  stores  ob­
taining  milk  from  licensed 
dealers;  (2) where sold for
consumption on premises; (3)
milk used or sold in manufac­
tured form shall  not be in­
cluded in determining license
fees.  Board may not prevent
giving of milk for charity. 
Act shall supplement but not
supplant existing laws as to
health regulations and testing
and inspecting milk.  Exclud­
ed from price fixing is milk
that goes for charity.  Those 
whose milk is sold on premises
for consumption and producer
who sells only to a distributor
are not dealers.  Provisions of 
the act shall not interfere with 
activities of cooperatives. 
Under certain conditions, the
commission shall be required
to withdraw from a market. 
Law shall  not  conflict  with 
existing laws relating to pub­
lic health. 
Exercise of authority shall ap­
ply only to "regulated milk" in
any "regulated milk market."
Act shall not limit the power
of any municipality to license
or to regulate the distribution
in any manner not consistent
with this act. Table 2.  ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 
State, date
of approval 
ALABAMA 
7/9/35
3/20/39
9/21/39 
(1)
(2) 
CALIFORNIA 
(Stabilization
and Marketing
Act)
 
6/1/35

4/21/37
Resale 6/17/37
1939 
(1) 
CONNECTICUT 
5/24/33
5/29/35
 
1937
 
1939
 
(1) 
FLORIDA 
6/12/33
5/29/35
6/9/37
5/) 31/39
 
(1

(2) 
Law expires 
6/30/39
Permanent 
Permanent 
Permanent 
Permanent 
6/30/35
6/30/37
6/30/39
Permanent 
Type of agency, membership,
salaries 
Milk  Control  Board.  No  local 
committees provided for but may
function.  5  members  appointed
and  removable by Governor:  1 
wholesale  producer,  1  producer.
distributor,  1  distributor,  1  con­
sumer, 1 member not in milk busi­
ness.  Appoint an executive secre­
tary  to  be  administrator.  $7.50
a day on official duty plus subsist­
ence and traveling expenses. 
Director of Agriculture aided by
local control boards.  Local boards
consist of  7 members:  3  distrib­
utors;  1 producer-distributor; 2 re­
tail  storekeepers;  1  consumer.  2­
year  term.  Also  provisions  for
local control board consisting of  7 
producers to  aid director  in each 
market.  $5 a day and mileage for
meetings for each member of the
local control board. 
1933: Milk Control Board.  1935:
Milk Administrator with 2 depu­
ties  engaged  in  milk  production.
Special services performed by state
departments.  Administrator  se­
lected by governor for 2 years with
advice and consent of General As­
sembly.  Administrator must have
been a producer 2 years before
appointment  to  office.  Adminis.
trator$5,000.
 
Board within Department of Agri­
culture.  Technical  service  to  be 
given by Department of Agricul­
ture as far as possible.  7 mem­
bers: Commissioner of Agriculture,
State Health Officer,  Director  of 
Milk Control Board,  1  citizen not 
connected  with  milk  industry,  1 
producer,  1  producer-distributor,  1 
distributor.  Appointed and remov­
able by Governor.  Each member
must put up a bond.  4-year term.
No  pay  for  members  but  get
traveling expenses.  Director to re­
ceive not more than $3,600. 
Source of financing 
Yearly fees:  store $2.50; producer
(2 cows or more) 75 cents each;
distributor  and  processor  on  a­
mount handled.  (Varies $10  for
50 gallons or less up to $400 for
3,000 gallons or more a day); pro­
ducer-distributor license fee as pro­
ducer and fee on amount he buys
as distributor. 
Revenue to be used for adminis­
trative  expense,  educational  and 
sales stimulation.  Distributors pay
assessment  fee  to  director which 
they  deduct  from  producer  pay­
ments  (2  mills per pound milk
fat).  Distributors who do not buy 
or  receive milk fat  shall  pay  7
mills for each 10  gallons of fluid
milk sold.  License fees from dis­
tributors:  less than 50 gallons a
day $3, graduated up to $50 for
500 gallons or more per day.  Pro­
ducer with less than 5 cows is ex­
empt from any provisions of the
Act. 
Revenue obtained from license fees 
from dealer graduated as to volume
of business.  Administrative costs
must be kept within amount col­
lected from license fees. 
License fees.  Distributor $5 plus
$5 for each truck or car operated
over 1, applies to producer-distribu­
tors  and  sub-dealers.  Producer 
and producer-distributor must get
annual permits  to  operate.  May
require them to keep records.  Tax 
placed on distributors of 1/10 of 1
cent on each gallon of milk dis­
tributed  each  month.  All  route 
salesmen, solicitors and milk truck
drivers pay license of $1.  Stores
obtain a permit only to buy and
sell milk.  Expenditures not to ex­
ceed revenues. 
General powers of agency 
Cannot exercise powers until:  (1)
set up milksheds as natural mar­
keting areas.  (2)  Petitioned by
majority  of  producers,  producer-
distributors  and  distributors  in
milkshedmust have  health  per­
mit  where  laws  are  in  effect. 
Board not required to vacate once
established but may withdraw from
a milkshed whenever it desires. 
Milk or cream:  plan conditioned 
on  (1)  65  per cent or more by
number and volume of producers
in the marketing area,  (2)  after 
plan is formulated by Director, pub­
lic hearings on plan are held. Ter­
mination: (1) fluid milk or cream
55 per cent of producers request
by number or volume. (2) Director
may end agreement  after  notice
and public hearing. 
(1) May  initiate  investigations.
(2) Mandatory to license all deal­
ers selling milk within the state.
(3) Require reports from dealers. 
Boardinstrumentality of the state.
To supervise and regulate entire
milk industry of the state.  Pro­
hibit  using,  buying,  purchasing,
selling, offering for sale, disposing
of or trafficking in any milk and/or
cream bottle, can or container by
anyone other than the owner or
his agent.  Board may require  li. 
censees to keep records.  Commis. 
sion shall withdraw exercise of its 
powers in any market upon petition
by 51 per cent in number and vol­
ume of producers.  Marketto con­
tain not less than 1,000 population. 
Products to be controlled
 
Milksold as milk, cream, butter.

milk, and skimmed milk sold or in­
tended to be sold as such for hu­
man foodexcludes milk for any
other purpose. 
Fluid milkall milk produced in
conformity with quality standards
prescribed by the Agricultural Code
for "market milk" classes estab­
lished.  Fluid  creamall  cream
from fluid milk or whole milk pur­
chased for derivation of cream. 
Fluid milk or cream. 
Milkliquid  milk  and/or  cream 
fresh, sour, or storage; and/or con­
centrated whole milk except in her­
metically sealed cans originally ob­
tained from the complete milking of
one or more healthy cows. GEORGIA
 
3/30/37  8/15/41
1939  8/15/41 
(1) 
INDIANA
 
3/12/35  7/1/37
3/11/37  7/1/39
2/28/39  7/1/41
(1)
(2) 
LOUISIANA
 
7/2/38  Permanent 
(1) 
MAINE
 
2/27/35 Permanent 
3/30/39 
(1) 
Board of 7 members appointed and
removed by Governor. Member col­
lecting money must be bonded.  2 
producers,  2  producer-distributors
(1 from cooperative), 1 distributor, 
1  store licensee,  1  consumer.  Di­
rector appointed by Governor;  di­
rector may appoint assistants. $6 a
day while on duty, subsistence and
traveling expenses.  Director's pay
not to exceed $4,000. 
Milk Control Board.  Local milk 
committees selected by Board from
producers and distributors  aid  in 
enforcement  and promulgation  of 
Act.  5 members appointed and re­
movable by governor.  Commission­
er of Agriculture is Chairman, 2
distributors, 2 producers. May em­
ploy assistants.  Not over $15 per
day except Commissioner of Agri­
culture.
 
Louisiana  Milk  Commission.  7
 
members:  President of Louisiana 
State Board of  Health,  Commis­
sioner of Agriculture and Immigra­
tion, Executive Secretary of State
Livestock Sanitary Board, 4 mem­
bers appointed by Governor for 4 
years.  2 of 4 shall be producers.
May appoint secretary.  Secretary
to receive not more than $5,000.
$10 per day plus 10 cents per mile
for each day on official duty for
appointed members.
 
Milk Control Board.  Obtain  as­
sistance  from other  departments,
especially Department of Agricul­
ture.  Governor with advice and 
consent of Senate shall appoint 2
producers, 1 producer-distributor, 1
dealer.  May  appoint  secretary.
Per diem determined by Governor,
traveling expenses. 
License fees: store $2.50. Producer 
not in excess of 2 cents per 100
pounds  produced.  Producer-dis­
tributor not in excess of 2 cents 
per  100  pounds produced or  re­
ceived  from  others.  Distributor
not in excess of 2 cents per 100
pounds received.  Producers,  pro­
ducer-distributors  and  distributors 
pay monthly on milk received or
handled  in  previous month.  No 
fee  required  for  milk  not  con­
sumed in the designated milkshed.
Money goes to Milk Control Fund. 
Annual license  fees:  distributors 
$35 for less than 1,000 pounds per
day up to $825 for 60,000 to 75,000
pounds per  day;  producer-distrib­
utors $2 less than  3  dairy cows,
over 3 $1 for each multiple of 3;
distributing broker $15.  Fees go
into general fund of state.  Mar­
keting  services rendered by local
committee  financed by deductions
from producer payments.  Legislat­
ure appropriated $26,500 for 1939­
1940. 
Appropriate  $25,000  yearly  from 
General Fund of the state. 
Amount spent  for  administration 
not  to  exceed  amount  collected 
from  fees,  etc.  Each  licensed 
dealer and producer-dealer pays $1
yearly and not over 1 cent per 100
pounds as monthly payments based
on quantity sold, for administrative
needs.  One-half payment may be
deducted from producer payments.
Any producer selling less than 10
quarts daily on his own premises is
not considered a  producer-distrib­
utor and  is  not required to pay
license fees. 
Board may designate milksheds and
hold election in milksheds to deter­
mine if provisions of act apply in
the shed. Each producer, producer-
distributor and distributor having
a municipal or county permit to sell
milk in milkshed has 1 vote. Board
to enforce provisions of the Act,
supervise and regulate production,
transportation, manufacturing, stor­
age, distribution, delivery and sale
of milk; to administer oaths, sub­
poenas, etc.  Board may issue or­
ders and rules and must post same
in Director's office and publish in
milkshed.  May require records to
be kept and turn in reports. 
Exercise powers on own initiative,
except wholesale and resale prices
to be set in an emergency through
request by:  30  per cent of  dis­
tributors handling 70 per cent of
volume, or 70 per cent of distribu­
tors handling 30 per cent of vol­
ume.  If board determines emer­
gency exists in a market shall pub­
lish notice and hold hearings to es­
tablish a market area. 
Make necessary rules and regula­
tions for carrying out the purpose
of the act.  May appoint dairy in­
spector and testers.  Tuberculosis 
tests to be made as often as deemed 
necessary. 
Supervise, regulate, and control the
distribution and sale of milk for 
consumption within the state. Board
may adopt, promulgate, and enforce 
all  rules and orders necessary to
carry out the provisions of this act.
Board designates the markets. Pro­
vision stating the Board shall not
exercise its powers in any market 
except  upon  written  petition  by
dealers, etc., was repealed in 1939 
Milkincludes raw milk,  pasteur­
ized milk, cream, buttermilk,  fla 
vored milk, ice cream mix, and re­
conditioned milk.  Does not include 
butter, cheese, etc. 
Milk sold as fluid milk and also 
cream,  buttermilk,  and  skimmed 
milk sold,  or intended to be sold 
as such for human food, including
milk sold or manufactured as sur­
plus milk. 
Milk, cream, and fresh milk for 
fluid consumption.  Shall not sell 
milk that has had water added to 
it,  is wholly or partially skimmed,
is not of standard quality, misrep­
resented milk, milk from diseased
cows, milk handled, stored, etc. in
unsanitary  manner.  Skim  milk 
may be sold if container is plainly
marked "skimmed milk." 
Fluid milk and cream. 
(1) Separability Clause.  If any portion of the Act is held to be invalid the remaining provisions shall not be affected.
(2) Savings Clause.  None of the law's provisions shall be deemed to apply to interstate or foreign commerce except as may be permitted by the Federal Constitution and the laws of 
the United States. State, date
of approval 
MASSACHUSETTS 
7/2/34
1936 
7/2/37)
5/19/38)
6/19/39 
(1)
(2) 
MONTANA 
3/6/35
3/17/39
(1)
(2) 
NEW HAMPSHIRE 
1935 
5/13/37
5/31/39
(1)
(2) 
NEW JERSEY
5/ /33
4/29/35
5/27/37
5/26/39
(1)
(2) 
Law expires 
6/30/36
6/30/38
6/30/39 
6/30/41 
No provision
Permanent 
By legislature 
or governor
Permanent 
Permanent 
7/1/36
6/30/37
6/30/39
6/30/41 
Table 2. 
Type of agency, membership,
salaries
 
Board of Milk Control within De­
partment of Agriculture.  3  citi­
zens appointed and removable by
Governor with advice and consent 
of Council.  May have an Admin­
istrator and other technicians.  $10 
per diem and travel expenses. 
Milk Control Board of S members 
appointed and removable by Gov­
ernor.  Board may foster in each
marketing area a local board com­
posed of all licensees.  Aid Board 
in determining costs, etc., for basis
of price fixing and enforcing pro­
visions of the Act.  May receive
up to 10 per cent of all fees col­
lected  for their services.  Execu­
tive officer of Montana State Live­
stock Sanitary Board as chairman. 
1  consumer,  1  producer,  1  pro­
ducer-distributor,  1  distributor.  4 
years each.  Board shall select ex­
ecutive secretary.  Must file bond.
Chairmanno pay.  $5 a day plus
subsistence.
 
Milk Control Board.  3 members
 
not more than 2 from same politi­
cal party.  Appointed by Governor
with consent of Council for period
of 3 years.  May employ assistants.
$7 per day and expenses for each
day in service.  Assistant's salary
set by Governor and Council. 
Milk Control Board.  5 citizens of 
the state.  At least one consumer,
producer and distributor must be
on Board.  Appointed and remov­
able by Governor.  Administration 
placed in hands of a secretary and
his assistants.  Board makes final 
decisions only on matters coming
from the secretary.  Per diem $10 
and expenses. 
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION(Continued) 
Source of financing  General powers of agency 
Annual license fee of dealers not  Exercise powers on own initiative
more than $5, and by monthly as- except  in  fixing  resale  prices
sessments of not more than 2 cents  need petition to do so by 25 per
per 100 pounds.  Dealer may de- cent of producers asking for mini-
duct  of this amount from the  mum resale prices in a designated
producer's share.  Producer-distrib- zone.  The Board may maintain or
utor does not have to pay volume withdraw the prices thereafter with-
assessment  below  50  quarts  but out petition.
must pay license from $2 to t5
depending on volume handled.
 
Annual  license  fees.  Producer- Supervise,  regulate,  and  control
 
distributor $1 for each 600 gallons fluid milk industry in Montana, in-
or fraction thereof sold.  Producer cluding production,  transportation,
50 cents per 600 gallons or frac- processing,  storage,  distribution,
tion thereof  sold.  Distributor 50 and sale  of milk;  investigational
cents per 600 gallons or fraction powers; subpoena persons and rec-
thereof  sold  by  him.  Producer- ords;  administer  oaths;  exercise
aistributor or distributor who han- powers only in markets designated
dles sweet cream but no milk shall  or  established  by  the  Board by
pay $1.  canvassing producers, producer-dis­
tributors, and distributors to see if
majority of above in number and
volume desire such a market. Board 
may withdraw but shall make can­
vass to see if desired by majority
as above.  If notwill not with­
draw. 
Appropriated $12,000 for each year Exercise  powers  to  full  extent
for the operation of the Board from granted in the act upon its own
the Treasury.  All money collected initiative.  1937 amendment chang­
from license fees and fines goes to es  1935  law by eliminating  the the general revenue of the State "consent feature" (prohibited Board
and not to the Board.  Fees vary from  acting  unless  petitioned by from 2 to 200 quarts dailyabove percentage of volume or number.)
200 quarts is $5 extra for each 100
quarts or fraction thereof.
 
Annual license  fees.  Stores$1  Exercises power on own initiative

unless milk consumed on premises. in any way to effectuate the pur­
Dealer-2,500 pounds monthly pays pose of the act.  The law states
$2up to 5,000,000 pounds month- how the Board shall act in licens­
ly  pays  $800.  Subdealer  $10.  ing milk dealers and establishing
Processor selling to sub-dealer $250. prices.
Dealer selling in another state $25.
On applying for license dealer or
processor must deposit $100 until
Board determines amount of license 
fee. 
Products to be controlled
 
Fluid milk, cream, and fresh, sour,

or stored skimmed milk and but­
termilk, irrespective of whether or
not such milk is flavored. 
Milk is fluid milk and cream sold 
for consumption as such. 
Fluid milk, cream, skim milk or
buttermilk,  fresh,  sour or  stored,
irrespective of whether or not such
milk is flavored. 
Milk  product  of  dairy animals
with view to being sold for human
consumption and  also  cream,  ice 
cream mix, buttermilk, and skimmed
milk, sold or intended to be sold
as such for human food, and also
flavored milk. NEW YORK 
4/10/33
3/30/34
4/1/35
4/1/36 
5/19/37
1939 
(1)
(2) 
3/31/34
4/1/35*
4/1/36*
4/1/37*
*Part of Act 
permanent
since 1934 
Permanent 
Permanent 
Division of Milk Control with De­
partment of Agriculture and Mar­
kets.  Advisory committee of 11 to
15,  selected by Commissioner.  5 
members are producers or distrib­
utors.  Director  of  division  ap­
pointed by Commissioner  of  Ag­
riculture  and Markets.  Regular
salary. 
Direct appropriations of the state
$220,000 in 1937. State receives
license fees.  Range from $25 for
a volume up to 4,000 pounds daily
to $5,000 for a volume of 1,000,­
000 pounds or more daily.  Dealers 
and cooperatives  not operating a
milk plant pay $25 fee.  Distribut­
ing broker pays $25 fee. 
Department has control of sale and
production of milk in the state and
fixes  prices  to  producers.  Com­
mission issues orders.  Commission 
not limited by need of requests for
action.  Quotas  and  equalization
of  prices  not  permissible  unless 
established  in  whole New York 
milkshed and order  for  equaliza­
tion of prices must be approved by
majority  vote  of  advisory  com­
mittee. 
Liquid milk and/or cream, fresh,
sour, or storage; and/or condensed 
or  concentrated  whole  milk,  ex­
cept  in  hermetically sealed  cans. 
Includes butter. 
OREGON 
12/9/33
11/1/35
2/24/39
(1) 
Permanent 
Milk Control Board.  Director of 
State Department of Agriculture,
or representative, to be executive
secretary of the board.  3  mem­
bers, one from each congressional
district.  Appointed and removable
by Governor.  No member to be 
connected  in  any way with  the 
fluid milk business.  $10 per diem
and expenses.  Per diem not  to 
exceed $150 in any month.  No 
pay for executive secretary. Board
appoints  administrator.  Salary:
$4,200. 
Annual license fee of $1 by milk
dealers and stores. Monthly pound­
age  assessment  by  milk  dealers 
only.  Original assessment / cent 
per  pound butterfat  handled by
milk dealer.  Changed in 1935 to
cent per pound. 
Board may act on own motion and
initiativeempowered to supervise,
regulate and control the production
and handling of milk as defined
and to the full extent as provided
in the statute. 
Fluid milk and sweet cream sold 
for  human  consumption  in  the 
fluid form. 
PENNSYLVANIA 
1/2/34
4/30/35
4/28/37
(1)
(2) 
4/30/35
4/30/37
Permanent 
Milk Control Board.  3  citizens,
resident and voters of Pennsylva­
nia.  Nominated by  Senate  and 
with its consent appointed by the
Governor.  Board may select a sec­
retary  and  assistant.  $6,500  to 
chairman.  $6,000 to others. Mem­
ber shall hold no other office. 
Money from license fees, penalties
goes to Treasury into Milk Control
Fund for expenses of Board. Fees:
dealer who handles  not over 20 
pounds  daily  pays  $1  and  over 
1,000,000 pounds daily $5,000. Sub­
dealer$15 for each route owned 
or operated.  Appropriated $250,000
from June 31, 1935 to April 30,
1937. 
Board may act on its own initia­
tive and without petition on part
of producers, distributors or others.
In certain specific instances (main­
ly price fixing)  the Board has to 
have the approval of the Governor. 
Fluid milk and cream, fresh, sour 
or  storage, skimmed milk,  butter­
milk, ice cream mix, condensed or
concentrated whole or skim milk,
except in hermetically sealed cans
or containers. 
RHODE ISLAND 
5/5/34
3/31/36
1937 
1939 
(1)
(2) 
3/31/36
Permanent 
Permanent 
Permanent 
Board of Milk Control.  Technical 
and legal assistance to be engaged
from state departments.  Independ­
ent of Department of Agriculture.
3 members on Board:  1 producer, 
1  consumer,  1  distributor.  Not 
more than $15 per day. 
Cost of administration not to ex­
ceed the aggregate amount of fees
collected  yearly.  License  fees 
from licensed  distributors  of  $1. 
Volume monthly  assessments  not 
to exceed 2 cents per 100 pounds
from dealers based on monthly to­
tal  quality of milk sold as  fluid 
milk or cream. 
Board acts on its own initiative in 
all matters over which it has juris­
diction.  Before minimum prices
to producers are  set Board must 
be  petitioned by 51  per cent  of 
producers within marketing area.
Can terminate at request of 51 per
cent of producers. 
Liquid milk and/or cream, fresh, 
sour,  or  storage;  skimmed  milk 
and buttermilk, whether or not fla­
vored.  Cream is anything over 6
per cent butterfat.  (Heavy cream
contains not  less  than 38  per
cent butterfat.) 
VERMONT 
7/19/35
3/26/37
2/17/39
(1)
(2) 
By legislature
or Governor. 
Permanent 
Permanent 
Milk Control Board.  May employ
necessary assistants.  3 members: 
Commissioner of Agriculture, Com­
missioner of Public Welfare, citi­
zen.  Appointed biennially by Gov­
ernor.  No pay to Commissioners.
Citizen pay determined by Gover­
nor. 
All expenses must be covered by
receipts.  Annual license fees from
dealers and producers vary from 
$2  to  $10  according  to  volume 
handled.  10 to 20 quarts $2, over
500 quarts $10.  Under 1933 act 
producers paid volume assessments.
Producers producing less than 10
quarts  daily  not  required  to  be 
licensed. 
Board operates under own initia­
tive and has power to  supervise,
regulate,  and  control  distribution 
and sale of milk, subject to certain
limitations. 
Fluid milk, cream, skim milk, or
buttermilk, fresh, sour, or storage,
whether flavored or not. 
(1) Separability Clause.  If any portion of the Act is held to be invalid the remaining provisions shall not be affected.
(2) Savings Clause.  None of the law's provisions shall be deemed to apply to interstate or foreign commerce except as may be permitted by the Federal Constitution and  the laws of 
the United States. Table 2.  ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION(Continued) 
practices. 
State, date
of approval  Law expires 
Type of agency, membership,
salaries  Source of financing  General powers of agency 
VIRGINIA 
3/29/34
3/27/40 
(1)
(2) 
By legislature
or Governor. 
State  Milk  Commission.  Local 
Milk Board of 5 members subordi­
nate to Milk Commission in each 
market.  Two producer representa­
tives, 2 distributor representatives,
1 consumer representative appoint­
ed  by  Commission  is  chairman. 
Three members of  state commis­
sion  appointed and removable by
Governor:  producer,  producer-dis­
tributor,  1 member in no way con­
nected with milk business.  Secre­
tary appointed by Commission as
administrator.  Technical  services 
performed by Department of Agri­
culture, and Virginia Experiment
Station and Extension Service. Per 
diem to members of only $10. 
Assessments on local milk boards 
not over 2 cents per 100 pounds.
Local board to meet expenses and
assessment by commission may levy
assessment not to exceed 4 cents 
per 100 pounds of milk or cream
converted to milk of 4  per cent
butterfat;  borne by producer and
I  by  distributors  handling  such 
milk or cream.  Have no license 
fees. 
Require hearing to precede exer­
cise  of power in any market, or
withdrawal after regulations have
been in effect.  Hearings called by:
milk commission, producers'  asso­
ciation, or producers if no associa­
tion,  distributors  if  distributing
major part  of milk consumed in 
the  market.  Commission  must 
withdraw upon written application
of majcrity of producers and dis­
tributors  (as  to  volume)  acting
jointly. 
WISCONSIN 
7/2/33
Spring 1935
Spring 1937
10/13/39
(1) 
6/30/37
On or before 
12/31/39
On or before 
12/31/41 
Department  of  Agriculture  and 
Markets.  Personnel  of  Depart­
ment of Agriculture and Markets.
Regular salary. 
State Appropriation Funds.  Cost
of administering is met by a de­
duction by each  dealer from the 
price to his producers, and not to
exceed  1  cent per 100 pounds of
fluid distribution.  Have annual li­
cense fees for dealers of $10. 
On its own initiative or on peti­
tion in writing the department can
inquire into and determine regu­
lated milk markets and prescribe
such terms and conditions for the 
purchasing,  receiving,  and  hand­
ling or selling of regulated milk in
any such market as  it  shall  find 
necessary to eliminate unfair meth­
ods of competition or unfair trade
(1) Separability Clause.  If any portion of the Act is held to be invalid the remaining provisions shall not be affected.
(2) Savings Clause.  None of the law's provisions shall be deemed to apply to interstate or foreign commerce except as may be permitted by the
the United States. 
Products to be controlled
 
Clean milk from healthy, properly

cared  for cows,  prepared with  a 
view of  selling  it  as  fluid  milk,
cream, buttermilk, and skim milk.
Excludes milk sold or intended for 
sale for any other purpose. 
"Regulated milk," fluid milk, whole
or skimmed, and fluid cream, but­
termilk,  and  cottage  cheese,  and
any other milk received by any
dealer. 
Federal Constitution and the laws of 